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Abstract 
In this paper, we investigate evidence of market discipline from contingent convertible (CoCo) 
issues. Previous research has focused on the monitoring aspect of market discipline, by testing 
risk sensitivity of market prices (subordinated notes and debentures (SND)) to accounting 
measures of bank risk. We take a similar approach using CoCo spreads and additionally use issue 
specific features. We analyze the CoCo market from the first issue in 2009 to Q1 2014, covering 
a sample of 118 contingent convertibles. Our findings provide evidence of market discipline, 
suggesting that investors are sensitive to the risk profile of the issuing bank. Moreover, several 
features incorporated in the contracts prove to have a significant relationship to the spread of 
these instruments.               
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1. Introduction 
In this first chapter an introduction to the subject is given. Starting with a presentation of the 
background which leads up to our research question and the purpose of this paper. The chapter 
ends with a discussion about delimitations of the study and a description of key definitions. 
 
1.1 Background 
The Global Financial Crisis (GFC) of 2007-2009 revealed weaknesses in national and 
international financial oversight and resolution frameworks (Pazarbasioglu, Zhou, Leslé and 
Moore, 2011). In particular, governments in countries hit by the crisis had to provide significant 
levels of support to financial institutions in order to protect financial stability and contain the 
crisis (Pazarbasioglu et al., 2011). The interventions contributed to a significant increase in 
sovereign exposures (Pazarbasioglu et al., 2011), which spurred the recent sovereign debt crisis. 
As the fragility of the financial system itself and modern financial institutions has been revealed 
(Buergi, 2013), it has become clear that financial institutions around the world had built up huge 
and concentrated credit and liquidity risks from their investments (Calomiris & Herring, 2013). 
The maintained equity capital by financial institutions proved too small and inadequate relative 
to the risks to properly absorb losses and provide insulation from insolvency when risks 
materialized (Calomiris & Herring, 2013). Furthermore, during the GFC a majority of existing 
hybrid capital instruments did not absorb losses as they were designed to do (Pazarbasioglu et 
al., 2011). This has brought the issue of capitalization of financial institutions, and the extensive 
amount of implicit guarantees of financial institutions to both the regulators and the public’s 
attention. To address the problem of the so-called too big to fail banks, and to address the risk of 
worsening moral hazard and market discipline regulators have moved to strengthen bank 
regulation. 
 
A recent move to strengthen bank regulation in Europe was when the European Commission 
announced in July 2013 that the so-called Capital Requirements Directive IV package, which via 
a regulation and a directive transposes the Basel III agreement into EU law (European 
Commission, 2013). Under the new EU law all capital instruments (except common equity) 
included in regulatory capital of a financial institution must have a loss absorption mechanism; 
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the instrument should be converted fully into common equity capital or be fully and permanently 
written down. Financial instruments with this loss absorption mechanism are commonly referred 
to as contingent convertible capital instruments or contingent convertible bonds.   
 
In 2002, Flannery (2002) proposed a new financial instrument called “Reverse Convertible 
Debentures” (RCD). The RCD would automatically convert to common equity if a bank’s 
market capital ratio would fall below a predefined level. According to Flannery (2002) the RCD 
would facilitate a transparent mechanism for reducing leverage in a bank and prevent financial 
distress without distorting bank shareholders’ risk-taking incentives. This financial instrument 
introduced by Flannery (2002) was arguably the first contingent convertible bond proposal. It 
was first after the GFC that it received considerable attention by regulators as a potential 
instrument to ease the impact of future financial crisis (Berg & Kaserer, 2014). Squam Lake 
Working Group on Financial Regulation (2009) recommended support for a similar financial 
instrument in the wake of the GFC, which they called Regulatory Hybrid Securities. Squam Lake 
(2009) argued for a proposed long-term debt instrument to expedite the recapitalization of banks. 
The new financial instrument would resemble long-term debt in normal times but converts to 
equity when both the financial system and the issuing bank are under financial stress (Squam 
Lake, 2009). The automatic conversion of debt to equity facilitates transformation of an 
undercapitalized or insolvent bank into a well capitalized bank at no cost to taxpayers, instead 
cost are borne by the bank’s investors. The group’s proposal aimed at lessening the need for, and 
expectations of costly government intervention to bailout unhealthy banks in times of financial 
crisis. 
 
Contingent convertible capital instruments (CoCos) are hybrid capital securities that absorb 
losses in accordance with contractual agreements when the capital of the issuing bank falls below 
a certain level (Avdjiev, Kartasheva & Bogdanova, 2013). The loss absorption can take place 
through a forced conversion of the CoCo into the shares of the issuing bank at a predefined 
conversion ratio (De Spiegleer & Schoutens, 2013), or through a partial or full principal write-
down of the face value of the CoCo (Avdjiev et al., 2013). The trigger that activates this 
mechanism can be either a predefined mechanical trigger, based on market or book values, or by 
a trigger referred to as discretionary, based on the supervisors’ discretion and judgment about the 
issuers’ solvency prospects. 
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The concept of CoCos has been a regular topic in major financial news providers during the last 
year. With increased interest among investors due to the current low interest rate environment, 
the search for yield has driven the demand for these instruments. However, from the issuers’ side 
the incentive to issue these instruments is closely linked to a more demanding regulatory 
framework implemented as a consequence of the recent problems in the financial sector. Several 
articles in the Financial Times cover this product and describe the market for CoCos as a way for 
banks to raise cheap capital in the current low interest rate environment, and indicating the 
market potential to be large since investors in fixed income products are trying to find yield 
(Ross, 2014). A comment by a head at JP Morgan in Germany provide some insight stating that 
investors may be buying these instruments just for the high yield and not fully understanding the 
underlying risk (Ross & Thomson, 2014). Since the market is relatively young the theoretical 
framework and template for pricing these is not fully developed, mispricing is a considerable risk 
and the track record short, which makes the product time-intensive to analyze. This view is 
reinforced in another recent Financial Times article, referring to an investor survey by Royal 
Bank of Scotland Credit Strategy (Keohane, 2014). When investors where asked why they invest 
in CoCos, close to 70% answered “Yield”.  
 
An article by Ross, Thompson and Atkins (2014) published in the Financial Times highlights the 
recent developments in the market for CoCos. The German finance ministry confirmed in April 
that CoCo coupons would be tax deductible, acting as a clearance for German banks to proceed 
with plans to issue CoCos. Numbers from Dealogic indicate that issuance of CoCos have hit a 
record $11.6 billion in 2014 compared to $4.2 billion for the same period 2013 according to Ross 
et al. (2014). According to the same article, Morgan Stanley estimate that the market for CoCos 
could grow to $250 billion in time. Analysts expect about €50 billion in CoCo issuance by 
European banks in 2014 (Ross et al., 2014), clearly this is a developing and growing market. 
Deutsche Bank plans to issue €5 billion in CoCos until end of 2015, with a first tranche of €1.5 
billion in mid 2014 (Ross, 2014). Commerzbank, Aareal Bank and Nord/LB are other German 
banks considering issuance of CoCos (Ross et al., 2014). A fixed income investor at Union 
Investment estimates the German banks will end up issuing more than €10 billion in CoCos 
(Ross et al., 2014). 
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CoCos would in theory be a good substitution for government intervention in times of distress. 
Recent increase in stress tests among banks and debate of higher capital requirements have also 
been an important factor for the more profound interest (Avdjiev et al., 2013). Since this paper is 
written at Lund University, the recent debate in the Nordic region regarding contingent capital 
cannot be ignored. Swedish authorities have made positive comments in this matter (see, e.g. 
Dagens Industri, 2012), but much however lies in the details since these instruments fast can be 
become complicated and difficult to fully understand. In our neighbor country Denmark this type 
of instrument has already been accepted by domestic regulation and several CoCos have been 
issued (Schwartzkopff, 2013). 
    
1.2 Problem discussion 
Given a brief background and introduction to the concept of contingent convertibles, further a 
common theme in academia is the concept of market discipline in banking. The definition of the 
term market discipline in banking is commonly separated into two distinct components, market 
monitoring and market influence (see, Bliss and Flannery, 2002; Flannery, 2001). Market 
monitoring refers to market investors’ (security holders’) ability to accurately evaluate changes 
in the financial condition of a firm, and incorporate those assessments into the security prices of 
the firm. Market influence refers to the process whereby outside security holders influence a 
firm’s actions, that is the market’s capacity to influence managerial actions to reflect the 
assessment of a firm’s condition. A lot of empirical research focuses on the first aspect, market 
monitoring. This is performed through testing risk sensitivity of market prices with linear 
regressions of market-based measures of bank risk (e.g. banks’ subordinated notes and 
debentures (SND) spreads) on a set of accounting measures of bank risk (see, e.g. Forssbӕck, 
2011; Sironi, 2003). A statistically significant relationship between the market-based measure 
and the accounting risk variables is interpreted as a sign that the market adequately prices risk 
(Forssbӕck, 2011). Therefore, indicating that market discipline can be an effective and useful 
mechanism to hold back excessive risk taking by banks. A failure to find a significant 
relationship would in the same way be interpreted as absence of market discipline (Forssbӕck, 
2011). Pazarbasioglu et al. (2011) argues that by using contingent convertible capital to meet 
more stringent capital requirements, banks could be less likely to fail and the possibility of 
burden sharing with investors would help improve market discipline. Market discipline is also 
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incorporated as the third “pillar” in the Basel III requirements by the Basel Committee on 
Banking Supervision, aimed at strengthening the role of market discipline through improvement 
of banks disclosure. 
The combination of increasing interest for contingent convertible capital instruments and 
previous empirical studies in market discipline especially the correlation between SND spreads 
and bank risk, opens up for additional research. To our knowledge, no previous studies have used 
subordinated debt in form of CoCos to test for market discipline in banking. Most of the previous 
research on CoCos has been focusing on suitable approaches to price and value these new 
instruments, another common research area is development of new designs of CoCos to avoid 
potential pitfalls in early issues and proposed designs. This leads us to believe that we have 
identified an interesting and developing research area to make a contribution to. To our 
knowledge, only a handful of previous student theses in Scandinavia cover the topic of 
contingent convertible capital, and these exclusively focus on pricing with a more technical 
approach analyzing and developing existing pricing models (see, e.g., Alvemar & Ericson, 2012; 
Brandt & Hermansson, 2013; Teneberg, 2012). This paper can in that aspect both add to previous 
knowledge and possibly encourage more interest for research covering CoCos at Swedish 
universities.               
The background of this new instrument and the discussion of market discipline gives a logic path 
to implement this discussion further to CoCos, as a new subordinated debt instrument. Since this 
is a fairly new instrument it is natural that both the academic community and practitioners will 
focus on the pricing aspect, however many interesting articles covering the qualitative aspects 
has also been written, which are further described in our theory and literature chapter (see, e.g., 
Berg & Kaserer, 2014; Chen, Glasserman, Nouri & Pelger, 2013; Hilsher & Raviv, 2014; Roggi, 
Giannozzi & Mibelli, 2013). The knowledge gap identified is to better understand the market for 
these instruments with regard to the underlying assets, which as far as we know haven’t been 
analyzed in the same way before. In this way we would be able to build on the established 
quantitative research with the possibility to use the more qualitative arguments to understand the 
results. Our approach would be to address the monitoring aspect of market discipline using 
accounting risk indicators. This is the most common approach in other research papers which 
investigate market discipline using other subordinated debt instruments.  
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CoCos instruments could have the same potential as other SNDs and would then become a 
central piece of banks financing structure (Pazarbasioglu et al., 2011). The fact that the issues 
have increased exponentially both in size and amount since the introduction in 2009 makes this 
an interesting area to investigate (Avdjiev et al., 2013). Combining the fact that the market for 
contingent convertibles is developing and growing in size rapidly, and that CoCos as financial 
instruments are both complex and created to exert market discipline, leads us to argue that it 
would be a good choice for testing evidence of the monitoring aspect of market discipline. 
Moreover, the stability of the financial sector can partly depend on CoCos in the future, which 
also makes this type of study interesting to conduct. If evidence of market discipline can be 
found using CoCos as a market-based measure it could implicate both that investors in CoCos 
actually are monitoring the underlying risk in their investments closely, and that similar evidence 
using less complicated subordinated debt instrument could potentially be found. On the other 
hand, if no evidence of market discipline can be found it could be argued that CoCos are not yet 
promoting market discipline as they are designed to do. This could also be an important 
indication that market participants have difficulties evaluating and incorporating risks in their 
pricing of these instruments.   
 
1.3 Research question and objectives 
 
Is there evidence of market discipline in the contingent convertible capital market?  
 
● This will be performed by investigating the correlation between spreads of CoCos and 
characteristic of banks issuing the instruments. Specifically, using well researched 
accounting-based indicators of bank risk. Our investigation includes all available issued 
instruments since the start of the market in 2009.          
 
The purpose of this paper is to be able to understand the behavior the CoCos that to a large 
extent is available today using previous well studied risk indicators. This paper will investigate if 
there is evidence of market discipline in the pricing of these instruments. Since no similar 
approaches have been used to analyze these instruments in the past, we would like to believe that 
this would add new knowledge to this area. Previous research in this instrument has been mainly 
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focusing on the pricing and other problematic features of the structure, and with our approach we 
believe that more understanding of the main drivers behind the spread movements and how 
investors view the differences in the issues could be better understood. The result could be 
interesting from both the issuers and investors perspective since a more transparent picture of 
how closely the underlying risk and issue specific features are linked to the spread, with both 
parties being able to develop a better understanding, and possibly a more efficient risk 
management when dealing with CoCos. 
 
1.4 Delimitations 
Some delimitations are necessary in order to make the study suited for its purpose. A more 
detailed explanation will be presented in the chapter four. 
 
● Definition of CoCos vary in previous research, some researchers only consider 
instruments with equity conversion features as being CoCos. However, the increase of 
issued instruments including a write-down mechanism that still have the same regulatory 
treatment under the Basel accords has broadened the definition. This study will include 
both equity conversion and write-down CoCo instruments, due to the reason that both 
have a loss absorption capability. 
● Since the instrument was introduced in 2009, the sample is limited to that period and so 
the data availability. This is an important aspect the will be discussed throughout the 
paper and its affect on the outcome of this empirical investigation. Some of the issuers of 
CoCos are non-financial firms and will be excluded from our study since the risk 
indicators are bank-specific and to avoid industry bias.    
● Regarding accounting risk indicators, only the most widely used will be included in the 
empirical investigation. We will focus on those proven in previous research to give the 
most information about the riskiness of the banks.  
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1.5 Definitions 
● CoCos: 
CoCos or contingent convertibles are the definitions that we use throughout the paper, 
however they are called differently in previous research such as, CCBs, contingent 
convertible debt/bonds, contingent capital.  
● SND: 
Subordinated notes and debentures, subordinated debt. Debt with lower seniority than 
other debt in a firm's capital structure. 
● Market discipline: 
The process which investors gather and evaluate information about a firm´s operations 
and incorporate this into its traded securities. Separated into two main features, 
monitoring and influence, with the former considered in this study. 
● Trigger: 
The trigger or trigger event is the mechanism through which the loss absorbing function 
of the CoCo instruments is activated. Mechanical - market or book value trigger defined 
by specific capital ratio, or Discretionary - determined by a supervisor and its prospect 
about the issuer's solvency. 
● Loss absorption: 
Equity conversion - conversion into shares, or write-down - partial or full write-down of 
the principal  
● RWA: 
Risk weighted assets. This ratio includes all assets and weights these in regards to their 
credit risk exposure. 
● Tier 1 Capital: 
A measure of financial strength and contains core capital in financial firms, introduced in 
the Basel framework. The Tier 1 capital ratio is calculated by dividing the Tier 1 equity 
capital by total risk weighted assets (RWA).  
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1.6 Outline 
The rest of the paper is going to be structured in the following way. After the introduction, the 
following chapter will present a more in depth explanation of the features of CoCos and issues to 
date and its market potential. Chapter three will give the reader a presentation of the theoretical 
framework that will be used and a literature review covering previous research on the topic of 
CoCos, in order to better understand key qualitative problems and pricing models of the 
instrument. The chapter will also provide a summary of risk indicators commonly used when 
testing for market discipline. The main theory of market discipline will be discussed more in 
depth and will lead up to our hypotheses that will be the base of our analysis and conclusion. 
Chapter four will present the method that we use to test our hypotheses and the process of 
gathering the data of CoCos, the accounting risk measures and control variables. 
Lastly, we will present and analyze our results following our generated hypotheses and conclude 
with some final thoughts. 
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2. Understanding Contingent Convertible capital instruments 
(CoCos) 
This chapter presents a more developed explanation of contingent convertible capital and its 
core features. Further, the chapter includes a brief presentation of CoCos issued to date, its 
market potential, investors and regulatory environment. 
 
2.1 Regulations 
2.1.1 Introduction to the Basel framework 
The Basel I accords was introduced in 1988, with the goal to provide minimum capital 
requirements for banks. Followed by the Basel II accords in 2004, which built on the first 
accords, provided a more international approach dealing with bank risks and was the beginning 
of providing different risk weights on different types of assets. The current Basel III accords from 
2011 have not been fully implemented to this date, however the core features of this accord are 
to increase capital requirements and enforce lower leverage among banks. 
 
Basel III is a comprehensive set of reform measures developed to strengthen the regulation, 
supervision and risk management of the banking sector (BIS, 2014). The Basel Committee on 
Banking Supervision (BCBS) presented the revised version of the Basel III regulations in 2011. 
These reform measures aim to improve the banking sector’s ability to absorb shocks arising from 
financial and economic stress (BIS, 2014). Moreover, the measures aim at improving risk 
management and governance, and strengthen banks’ transparency and disclosures. Basel III as an 
international regulatory framework for banks is a response to the market failures revealed by the 
GFC, and emphasizes the importance of that banks’ risk exposures are backed by a high quality 
capital base. One of the reasons that the GFC become so severe was the eroding level and quality 
of the capital base in banking sectors of many countries (BCBS, 2011a). The GFC showed that 
credit losses and write-downs had to come out of banks’ tangible common equity base, primarily 
out of retained earnings. Moreover, during the crisis a number of banks in distress were rescued 
by injection of public sector funds (at taxpayers’ expense), in form of common equity and other 
types of Tier 1 capital (BCBS, 2011b). This supported depositors but also meant that Tier 2 
capital and in some cases Tier 1 did not absorb losses incurred by the banks. For this reason the 
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Basel III rules stipulates that the predominant form of Tier 1 capital, the highest quality 
component of bank’s equity capital, must be retained earnings and common shares (BCBS, 
2011a). The Basel III framework separates total regulatory capital into three elements of capital: 
1. Tier 1 Capital (going-concern capital) 
a. Common Equity Tier 1 (CET1) 
b. Additional Tier 1 (AT1) 
2. Tier 2 Capital (gone-concern capital) (T2) 
For capital instruments to be included in these categories they need to meet a single set of 
associated criteria. One of the criteria for all non-common equity regulatory capital is to provide 
loss absorption. Additional Tier 1 and Tier 2 are the capital elements where contingent 
convertibles as a loss absorbing instrument can be eligible for inclusion. Risk weighted assets 
(RWA) is another core definition used in the Basel framework. This approach was introduced in 
the Basel I accords with the aim to provide a easy way to compare and calculate risks of banks 
across different countries, and also to give incentives for banks to hold low risk assets on their 
balance sheet. RWA is calculated using specific risk weights in regards to the different assets. 
 
Figure 2.1 CoCos in the Basel III framework 
 
(Avdjiev et al., 2013, p.47 graph 2) 
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2.1.2 Regulation for CoCos 
The main driver of issuance of contingent convertible debt has been the regulatory treatment of 
the securities, and the need for banks to boost their capital to comply with increasing capital 
requirements (Avdjiev et al., 2013). The BCBS presented the revised version of Basel III 
regulations in 2011 with the explicit objective to “[…] improve the banking sector’s ability to 
absorb shocks arising from financial and economic stress, whatever the source, thus reducing 
the risk of spillover from the financial sector to the real economy” (BCBS, 2011a,  p.1). Under 
the Basel III regulations hybrid capital instruments that include incentives to be redeemed (e.g., 
features such as step-up clauses) previously part of the Tier 1 capital base, will be no longer be 
recognized by the regulators and are now in the process of being phased out (BCBS, 2011a). In 
addition the Basel III rules stipulates that old Tier 3 capital instruments will be eliminated from 
regulatory capital and Tier 2 capital instruments will be harmonized (BCBS, 2011a). The 
changes proposed by Basel III have created room for development of new securities for banks to 
deal with minimum capital requirements. Under the Basel III, contingent convertible capital 
instruments can qualify as either Additional Tier 1 (AT1) capital or Tier 2 (T2) capital, both 
ranking below Common Equity Tier 1 (CET1) (see figure 2.1). For CoCos to be recognized as 
AT1 capital a set of minimum criteria has to be met (partial list of criteria) (see table 2.1 below): 
“Is perpetual, ie there is no maturity date and there are no step-ups or other incentives to 
redeem”, “May be callable at the initiative of the issuer only after a minimum of five years” 
“Instruments classified as liabilities for accounting purposes must have principal loss absorption 
through either (i) conversion to common shares at an objective pre-specified trigger point or (ii) 
a write-down mechanism which allocates losses to the instrument at a pre-specified trigger 
point.” (BCBS, 2011a, pp.15-17). For CoCos to be an instrument issued by the bank that meet 
the T2 criteria, the feature of no maturity date is relaxed and instead a minimum original 
maturity of at least five years is required (BCBS, 2011a, pp.15-17. In January 2011 BCBS issued 
requirements in addition to the criteria initially outlined in the Basel III rules. The additional 
minimum requirements aim at ensuring that all classes of capital instruments fully absorb losses 
at the point of non-viability. One of the additional requirements for AT1 and T2 capital inclusion 
is that terms and conditions of the instruments must have a provision that requires the instrument 
to be written off or converted into common equity at the option of the relevant authority, if a 
trigger event occurs (BCBS, 2011b). This has come to be known as the PONV trigger (Avdjiev 
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et al., 2013). The additional requirement of an inclusion of PONV clauses and definition of a 
trigger event applies to all issues from 1 January 2013. 
 
Table 2.1 Required features in Basel III 
Features required Additional Tier 1 Tier 2 
Trigger event Breaching an objective pre-specified trigger point PONV 
 PONV decision determined by relevant authority  
   
Trigger level Must be at least 5.125% Common Equity Tier 1 (CET1)  
Subordinated to Depositors, general creditors and subordinated debt of the 
bank 
Depositors & general creditors 
Maturity Is perpetual, ie there is no maturity date At least five years 
Callable At the initiative of the issuer At the initiative of the issuer 
 Only after a minimum of five years Only after a minimum of five years 
Coupon Full discretion by issuer at all times to cancel  
Other criteria No step-ups or other incentives to redeem No step-ups or other- incentives to 
redeem 
  No rights to accelerate the repayment 
of future schedule payments (coupon 
or principal), except in bankruptcy & 
liquidation. 
 
 
Inspired by Gupta et al. (2013). See BCBS (2011a) for complete information. 
 
In July 2013 the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision published a document with an update 
on assessment methodology and the additional loss absorbency requirement for Global 
systemically important banks (G-SIBs) (BCBS, 2013). This was of importance for contingent 
convertible capital instruments, especially the section about instruments to meet the higher loss 
absorbency requirement. The committee concluded that to increase the resilience of the 
institution as a going-concern G-SIBs is required to meet their higher loss absorbency 
requirement with only CET1 capital (BCBS, 2013). This meant that CoCos could not be used to 
meet the higher loss absorbency requirement imposed on G-SIBs. A continued review of 
contingent capital, and support of the use of contingent capital instruments such as high-trigger 
CoCos to meet higher loss absorbency requirements was emphasized (BCBS, 2013). 
 
The European Commission announced in July 2013 that the so-called CRD IV package will enter 
into force, which via a Regulation and a Directive transposes the Basel III agreement into EU 
law (European Commission, 2013). Under the new EU law all AT1 and T2 instruments of an 
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institution must have a loss absorption mechanism; the instrument should be converted fully into 
CET1 capital or be fully and permanently written down at the point of non-viability of the 
institution (European Union Law, 2013). 
 
National regulators such as the Swiss FINMA have shown interest in CoCos as an alternative to 
additional hard equity (Buergi, 2013). The Swiss regulators have required systemically important 
institutions (UBS and Credit Suisse) to hold additional capital, which can be issued inform of 
contingent capital (Hilscher & Raviv, 2014). Sundaresan and Wang (2013) referring to FINMA 
(2011), states that the Swiss regulator requires its largest banks to have a capital ratio of at least 
19%, whereof 10% equity and 9% contingent capital.  
A report by the Financial stability oversight council (2012) evaluates the potential for contingent 
convertibles within the US regulatory framework. The report is written upon requirement stated 
in the Dodd-Frank Act (section 115c) and later reported to Congress to address the feasibility of 
the instrument. The council concludes that the benefits of using contingent convertibles would be 
to strengthening financial institutions and to provide low cost capital. The definition of trigger 
and timing of the trigger is addressed as potential drawbacks regarding the instrument's structure.  
However, the experience from similar instruments in the US is limited so the council advices for 
further investigation in order to better understand the advantages and disadvantages of CoCos 
before a potential introduction to the US market.       
 
2.2 The Trigger 
Avdjiev et al. (2013) provide a useful introduction of different trigger types that currently are 
being used in issued CoCos. Avdjiev et al. (2013) firstly differentiate between two trigger types, 
the mechanical and the discretionary. The mechanical trigger can be either a market value trigger 
or a book value trigger (accounting value) defined numerically in terms of a specific capital ratio. 
The discretionary trigger (also known as point of non-viability (PONV) trigger) is activated 
based on the supervisors’ discretion and judgment about the issuers’ solvency prospects. Book 
value triggers are commonly defined as a certain regulatory capital ratio, where book value of 
Common Equity Tier 1 (CET1) capital as a ratio of risk-weighted assets (RWA) is becoming the 
most frequently used in issues since 2012 (Avdjiev et al., 2013). 
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2.2.1 Regulatory trigger 
As touched upon in the discussion of regulations above, the inclusion of discretionary triggers 
also known as regulatory triggers (sometimes referred to as point of non-viability (PONV) 
trigger) in CoCo issues has increased substantially over recent years (Avdjiev et al., 2013). The 
primary reason for this increase is that under the current Basel III framework a regulatory trigger 
(PONV) is a required element of contingent capital to be included in Additional Tier 1 (AT1) 
and Tier 2 (T2), capital that banks use to satisfy capital requirements (Avdjiev et al., 2013). The 
regulatory trigger allows regulators to activate the loss absorption mechanism of the CoCo when 
necessary to prevent the issuer from insolvency (Avdjiev et al., 2013). This feature empowers 
regulators to override any lack of timeliness or unreliability of book value triggers, but at the 
same time introduces uncertainty about the timing of the activation of the loss absorption 
mechanism (Avdjiev et al., 2013).   
 
2.2.2 Accounting value trigger  
The effectiveness of book value triggers are being analyzed and discussed in several research 
papers. Existing regulatory capital requirements for banks are primarily based on book values 
and capital ratios used are based on regulatory accounting measures of debt and capital, rather 
than market prices (Glasserman & Nouri, 2012). Naturally, triggers based on regulatory capital 
ratios in CoCos are a common feature of contracts. Such a trigger type can be found in one of the 
earlier proposals for regulatory hybrid securities by Squam Lake (2009) that suggests using a 
bank-specific trigger based on the ratio of Tier 1 capital to risk-adjusted assets, a measure used to 
determine capital adequacy. As pointed out by Avdjiev et al. (2013), the effectiveness of book 
value triggers depends both on the frequency, at which the ratios are calculated and disclosed, 
and the accuracy and consistency of internal risk models at the banks. Triggers based on reported 
capital ratios align with a regulatory framework but tend to be lagging indicators of a bank’s 
financial condition (Pazarbasioglu et al., 2011), this problem is a common critique against the 
use of triggers based on accounting values. Sundaresan and Wang (2013) follows a similar line 
of argument stating that accounting triggers tend to be backward looking and are prone to 
manipulation by bank managers. Calomiris and Herring (2013) similarly argue that book value as 
an accounting concept is subject to manipulation and is inevitably a lagging indicator of 
deterioration of a banks’ balance sheet. Sundaresan and Wang (2013) highlights the problem 
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exemplifying with Lehman Brothers and Bear Stearns, whose Tier 1 capital ratio was estimated 
to be 10.1% (in the month of bankruptcy) and 13.5% (in the month before bailout) respectively, 
ratios above the capital requirements in Basel III. Calomiris and Herring (2013) criticize Basel 
III, the authors argue that the reforms will not solve the fundamental problems of accurate risk 
measurement and maintenance of capital adequacy. The main argument for why the Basel 
approach to capital requirements produce errors and avoids timely recognition of losses, is that 
the measure of shareholders’ equity relies on accounting principles that combine book values and 
“fair values” when measuring capital compliance (Calomiris & Herring, 2013). According to 
Calomiris and Herring (2013) this approach delays recognition of losses and permits banks to 
conceal losses. The arguments above highlights the critique and potential problems with the use 
of a book value trigger in the contract terms of CoCo instruments. Despite the critique against 
the use of book value triggers, inclusion of 5.125% CET1/RWA ratio trigger has increased in 
CoCo issuance since the end of 2011 (Avdjiev et al., 2013). The development in this direction is 
driven by regulatory requirements. A criterion for Additional Tier 1 capital under Basel III 
requires included instruments to have a trigger level for conversion or write down of at least 
5.125% CET1 (BCBS, 2011c,  p.6). 
 
2.2.3 Market value trigger 
Many academic proposals advocate the use of market value and market based measures as 
trigger events to address potential shortcomings of accounting triggers (book value). Two market 
based measures for potential use as triggers are Credit Default Swaps (CDS) spreads and share 
price movements (Calomiris & Herring, 2013). Calomiris and Herring (2013) argue for equity 
values as the better of the two market-based measures. The authors propose using a “quasi-
market-value-of-equity ratio”, defined as a 90-day moving average of the ratio of market value 
of equity to the sum of the market value of equity and the face value of debt. This would limit 
the effect of share price fluctuations and noise in market value signals, and make it difficult for 
speculators to force a conversion of CoCos. Flannery (2009) advocated early on for the use of 
market based measure for the conversion trigger. Flannery (2009) argued that book equity values 
tend to lag bank’s market value, and that these lags are severe when a firm is facing financial 
difficulties. Flannery (2009) therefore argued for a conversion trigger expressed in terms of 
equity’s “contemporaneous” market value of outstanding common shares as a suitable solution. 
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Flannery (2009) reasons that market values are forward-looking and promptly reflect changes in 
a firm’s own condition, including so called off-book items. Sundaresan and Wang (2013) also 
advocates the use of CoCo triggers placed on market prices. The authors argue that common 
equity should be the natural choice for placing a market trigger. A trigger for forced conversion 
based on an easily observable market value of a publicly-traded security ensures that “[…] 
conversion is based on a criteria that is informative, objective, timely, difficult to manipulate, 
and independent of regulators' intervention, avoiding the problems associated with other types of 
triggers.” (Sundaresan & Wang, 2013, p.3). An important factor limiting the possibility to 
include a trigger based on market values can be linked to fact that many banks are private and 
hence lack publicly traded shares (see comment below in 2.3).  
 
2.2.4 Systemic trigger 
Systemic triggers, triggers linked to system-wide conditions have been suggested in different 
proposals for contingent capital (see, Pazarbasioglu et al., 2011; Squam Lake 2009). This 
systemic trigger would be based on the condition of the whole financial system. Pazarbasioglu et 
al. (2011) exemplifies possible systemic triggers as liquidity conditions, a market volatility index 
or a declaration by regulators that the financial system is suffering from a systemic crisis. The 
trigger design discussed by Squam Lake (2009) suggests that a systemic trigger must be 
accompanied by a bank-specific trigger. A trigger based only on crisis declaration by regulators 
could put enormous political pressure on regulators making the decision, and it could trigger 
forced conversion or write-downs for banks with a sound capital base. This could arguably 
distort incentives for those banks to remain at a sound capital position. Pazarbasioglu et al. 
(2011) clarifies advantages and disadvantages of a systemic trigger based on either supervisory 
discretion or declaration of a systemic crisis, or based on predetermined general conditions for 
the financial sector (loss rates, capitalization or cash to capital ratio). Advantages for the first 
type, according to the authors, are primarily a broad-based recapitalization of the banking system 
when regulators think it is needed. Disadvantages could be the strong reliance on regulatory 
judgment, and a potential lack of differentiation among firms might have unintended 
consequences resulting in inefficient recapitalization. The advantage with the second type is an 
automatic increase in the capitalization of the banking system in response to systemic credit 
losses. Disadvantages with this could be a too narrow trigger, the systemic risk could be caused 
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by something unrelated to credit losses. Overall systemic triggers have the advantage of 
addressing and reducing systemic risk. On the other hand, the discretionary element and the 
difficulty in predicting a systemic crisis have the disadvantage of reducing marketability of the 
CoCo instruments. These trigger characteristics would make rating and pricing of the instrument 
very complex. To our knowledge, a systemic trigger have not been included in the issued CoCo 
instruments to date, arguably the problem of both rating and pricing could be the reason.    
 
2.3 Loss absorption 
One of the defining characteristics of CoCos is the principal loss absorption mechanism. Under 
the Basel III agreement that is implemented to EU law through the CRD IV package, all 
instruments included in the Additional Tier 1 (AT1) and Tier 2 (T2) layers of regulatory capital 
must have a loss absorption mechanism (European Union Law, 2013). The two loss absorption 
mechanisms outlined in the regulation are; the instruments must be capable of being either, fully 
and permanently written down, or converted fully into Common Equity Tier 1 (CET1) regulatory 
capital. Further, the regulation states that loss absorption must be activated in the event that the 
issuing institution reaches the point of non-viability (PONV). An important distinction of the 
design of CoCos that should be pointed out, is that this type of contingent capital is not 
constructed to deal with liquidity problems. This is emphasized by both Culp (2009) and 
Pazarbasioglu et al. (2011) referring to research by Duffie (2010). CoCos does not generate new 
cash for the issuing bank when conversion is triggered, the conversion would stop the interest 
payments (coupons) but would other than that not generate additional liquidity, thus CoCos are 
unlikely to stop a liquidity crisis. Potentially if the conversion is perceived negative by the 
market, the conversion may actually create a liquidity squeeze for banks (Pazarbasioglu et al., 
2011).          
Gupta, Akuzawa and Nishiyama (2013) provide a useful clarification of the distinction between 
AT1 and T2 under Basel III, highlighting the two stages of loss absorption, a gone-concern basis 
and going-concern basis. Both AT1 and T2 must absorb losses on a gone-concern basis, that is at 
PONV, or when the regulator determines that the institution would become non-viable without a 
write-off, or if a decision of a public sector injection of capital has been made (Gupta et al., 
2013). The explicit objective of T2 capital is to provide loss absorption on a gone-concern basis, 
AT1 on the other hand is designed to provide recapitalization at an earlier stage. For AT1, if 
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there is a capital shortfall on a going-concern basis the institution must cancel the coupon 
payments, on further capital shortfall the principal loss absorption must be triggered when an 
objective pre-defined trigger point is beached (Gupta et al., 2013). For AT1, if the trigger level 
(minimum 5.125% CET1/RWA) is breached, the aggregate amount to be written-
down/converted must be at least the amount needed to return the institutions CET1 capital ratio 
to the trigger level, or the full principal value of the instruments (BCBS, 2011c). 
 
According to De Spiegeleer and Schoutens (2014), three write-down mechanisms are possible 
and have been used to date: full principal write-down, partial write-down and staggered write-
down. In a CoCo bond with a full principal write-down feature, the face value of the bond will be 
completely written off if the trigger level is breached. The first CoCo with a write-down feature 
was issued by Rabobank in 2010 and had a partial write-down, at the trigger event 75% of the 
face value is written off and 25% is repaid to the CoCo investor (De Spiegeleer & Schoutens, 
2014). The staggered write-down mechanism was introduced by Zuercher Kantonalbank (ZKB) 
in January 2012, when it issued a CoCo bond with a flexible write-down mechanism. De 
Spiegeleer and Schoutens (2014) describes the novelty in ZKBs issue as the fact that the CoCo 
investor would be imposed losses (write-downs in multiples of 25%) up to the point where the 
breach of the trigger was resolved. Principal write-down CoCos have accounted for more than 
half of CoCo issuance since 2009 and issuance have picked up over time (Berg & Kaserer, 
2014), different explanations for this pattern have been put forward. Firstly, the growing interest 
from fixed-income investors whose mandates prevent them from participating in issues with 
possible conversion into equity is arguably one feasible explanation (Avdjiev et al., 2013; Berg 
& Kaserer 2014). Secondly, the concern about the threat of dilution of existing shareholders, and 
the concern that CoCo investors would own a controlling stake after a conversion, is a strong 
argument for the choice of CoCos with a write-down feature (De Spiegeleer & Schoutens, 2014). 
Lastly, the simple fact that the issuing bank has no listed shares might make a write off the only 
viable solution, as highlighted by Berg and Kaserer (2014), only 41 out of the 124 Euro zone 
banks subject to ECB supervision is publicly listed, suggesting that this is significant 
explanation. 
Equity conversion is the other possible loss absorption mechanism with a conversion rate linked 
to either a predefined price or the market price at conversion or a combination of both (Avdjiev 
et al., 2013). Both De Spiegeleer and Schoutens (2014) and Gupta et al. (2013) provide an easily 
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accessible description and overview of loss absorption through conversion into common equity 
of the issuing bank. De Spiegeleer and Schoutens (2014) outline three possible choices for the 
conversion price; a floating conversion price, a fixed conversion price and floored conversion 
price. A floating conversion price is equivalent to setting the conversion price equal to the 
observed share price at the trigger event. A fixed (constant) conversion price on the other hand is 
a simpler solution, where the conversion price and thus the number of shares delivered are 
determined at issuance of the CoCo bond (Gupta et al., 2013). The third solution is a 
compromise of the two previous, where the conversion price is floored or caped. This structure 
that allows for conversion into a variable number of shares, is based on the determined share 
price level at the moment the CoCo gets trigger into conversion, but with a pre-specified floor or 
cap (Gupta et al., 2013). The conversion ratio will be an essential part of the structure since 
heavy dilution of the current shareholders could become a reality if the trigger is breached. Thus, 
current shareholders of the issuer will prefer a higher conversion price, and CoCo investors will 
on the other hand be better off when the conversion price is low. This can result in adverse 
incentives among investors in the issues and among the issuers, as discussed more extensively in 
chapter three. 
 
Figure 2.2 Graphical display of CoCo features 
 
Inspired by Avdjiev et al. (2013) 
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2.4 Investors in CoCos and potential market 
The CoCo market is still relatively small compared to other SND, however fast growing when 
considering the last few years issuance. Since 2009, approximately $ 109 billion worth of CoCos 
have been issued (see 4.1). According to Avdjiev et al. (2013) banks have issued approximately 
$550 billion worth of non-CoCo subordinated debt and around $4.1 trillion worth of senior 
unsecured debt between 2009 and mid 2013, as a comparison to issued CoCos during the same 
period. According to Avdjiev et al. (2013) the primary demand for CoCos has come from small 
private banks and retail investors. Demand from large institutional investors has been relatively 
low so far. In a sample of CoCo issues with a total combined volume of approximately $13 
billion, Avdjiev et al. (2013) finds that private banks and retail investor accounted for 52% of 
demand. Asset management companies accounted for 27% and hedge funds were responsible for 
9% of total demand (Avdjiev et al., 2013). Avdjiev et al. (2013) put forward two main factors 
that are holding back growth of the investor base for CoCos. The first factor is the absence of 
complete and consistent credit ratings for CoCo instruments. The second factor is the tension 
between the objectives of issuers’ regulators and prospective investor’s regulators’. An article in 
Financial Times from April 23, 2014 (Ross & Thompson, 2014), indicates a changing pattern in 
investor demand for CoCos. According to research by Union Investments, in seven recent issues 
of CoCos from leading European banks, asset managers bought over 60% and hedge funds 
bought less than 20%. The increased interest by asset managers suggests that CoCo bonds are 
quickly becoming an interesting alternative for investors in the hunt for yield. One important 
factor concerning investors and holders of CoCos is the risk for contagion effects. Pazarbasioglu 
et al. (2011) stated in their discussion of economic rationale of CoCos that there could be a case 
for certain restrictions on holders of the instrument. In particular to avoid investors that is other 
leveraged financial institutions of systemic importance.            
A recent development in the market is construction of indices covering CoCo bonds, which is 
expected to have a positive market effect since the track record becomes easily available. Bank 
of America Merrill Lynch has in the beginning of 2014 indicated that they are developing an 
index following CoCos, which arguably could give investors easier access and facilitate easier 
comparison to other products making the instrument more suited for a broader commercial 
market (Durand, 2014). Since CoCos is a fairly new and non-standardized product the process of 
assigning rating to the instruments by rating agencies has been rather slow. This is also the case 
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in the regulatory treatment that arguably is holding back the expansion. However, a trend is that 
an increasing number of countries are starting to include CoCo instruments in their domestic 
regulatory framework. One recent example is the approval in Germany for banks to be allowed 
to use CoCos in their financial structure. Rating agencies such as Moody's express that the 
instrument is new and not analyzed in term of distress making it difficult to assign a rating 
(Bauer, Fanger, Berg, LaMonte & Wilson, 2013). However with an increasing market size and 
increased acceptance in regulations, rating agencies should become more comfortable assigning 
ratings for CoCos. Increased coverage by rating agencies would also open up the market to 
institutional investors with demands of a particular rating in order (typically “investment grade”) 
to be able to invest (see e.g., Zähres, 2011). 
 
The tax treatment of CoCos has been assigned limited attention in academia, however for the 
market and potential demand for these instruments it is an important aspect. Banks with 
regulatory permission to use these instruments as AT1 or T2 under the Basel framework, and in 
countries with regulations that have the possibility to classify the coupons as tax-deductible are 
more prone to consider issuance of CoCos. Avdjiev et al. (2013) suggest that over approximately 
64% of the currently issued CoCos in their sample have tax-deductible coupons. Arguably this 
could potentially be a cheap source of financing for banks since it becomes treated as debt for 
taxation purposes, but have the possibility to count towards equity capital when it comes to the 
position in the capital structure. Pazarbasioglu et al. (2011) argue that the regulatory treatment of 
CoCos when it comes to tax treatment and position in the bank's capital structure will have a 
significant effect on the market development.   
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3. Theoretical framework and literature review 
 This chapter will introduce and discuss the theoretical framework and existing research which 
will be used to construct our hypotheses and guide us in the choice of explanatory variables. 
Firstly, a presentation of previous key theories covering pricing of CoCos, qualitative aspects 
and various CoCo design proposals. Secondly, the theory of market discipline will be discussed 
and related to this paper, ending in our developed hypotheses. 
 
3.1 Pricing models 
To understand how changes in various risk indicators for the issuing banks are reflected in the 
price of CoCos an understanding of how these instruments can be priced is needed. Below is a 
brief introduction of existing pricing models suggested in academia to date.   
 
A useful starting point for the overview and outline of existing pricing models for CoCo bonds 
can be found in a paper by Wilkens and Bethke (2014). Wilkens and Bethke (2014) conducts a 
comprehensive empirical analysis of the pricing of CoCo bonds, and from the findings suggests a 
“market standard” and preferred practitioner approach to pricing and hedging CoCos. The 
existing pricing models suggested and analyzed in academia can be grouped into three main 
approaches: 
 
● Structural models (see, e.g., Albul, Jaffee & Tchistyi 2013; Brigo, Garcia & Pede 2013; 
Cheridito & Xu, 2013; Glasserman & Nouri, 2012) 
● Equity derivatives models (see, e.g., Corcuera, De Spiegeleer, Ferreiro-Castilla, 
Kyprianou, Madan and Schoutens 2013; De Spiegeleer & Schoutens, 2011) 
● Credit derivative models (see, e.g., De Spiegeleer & Schoutens,  2011)  
 
The structural models all share common features but differ in their application. The models are 
based on the assumption that asset values follow a standard Brownian motion (Geometrical 
Brownian Motion). Building on the capital structure model by Merton (1974) and literature 
extending the framework of Merton (1974); Black and Cox (1976) and  Leland (1994).  
Therefore also leaning on the Black-Scholes-Merton Model (1973) for option pricing and 
valuation of credit risky debt.      
D. Iseklint & D. Bengtsson 
28 
 
Several structural models have been proposed and analyzed by researchers in academia. A 
commonly cited paper by Albul et al. (2013) builds on the capital structure model of Leland 
(1994) and assumes that total asset value follows a standard Brownian motion. Albul et al. 
(2013) uses a capital structure that includes equity and a straight bond, and then allows addition 
of contingent convertible debt into the structure. The authors focus is capital structure decisions 
and in the paper develops closed-form solutions for the value of equity conversion CoCos with 
market-based conversion triggers (stock price). Albul et al. (2013) set up two conditions that 
must hold, “No default before conversion” and “Monotonicity of equity value”. The second 
condition, explained as equity value is strictly increasing in asset value before conversion, gives 
a one-to-one correspondence between equity and asset values allowing for equity value to be 
modeled as a function of asset value, and the conversion trigger used is then an asset level (Albul 
et.al., 2013). 
Glasserman and Nouri (2012) use a similar structural approach starting from the firm’s assets, 
with a model that builds on research on capital structure by Merton (1974), Black and Cox 
(1976) and Leland (1994). The starting point is a stochastic process, the geometric Brownian 
motion that models the book value of the bank´s assets. The book value of assets is then used to 
drive the conversion of the contingent capital and the market value of assets is used to drive the 
valuation of the contingent capital (Glasserman & Nouri, 2012). A limitation of the model used 
is emphasized by the authors, the model does not allow for jumps in asset values.  
Another paper taking the structural approach to default modeling in CoCo pricing is Brigo et al. 
(2013). Brigo et al. (2013) adopts what is referred to as the firm value models area, attributed to 
Merton (1974) and Black and Cox (1976), and uses a standard Brownian motion as the asset 
value process. More specifically Brigo et al. (2013) uses a model developed by Brigo and 
Tarenghi (2004) called the analytically tractable first passage model. The approach taken in this 
paper considers explicitly and at the same time three features: Bond-Equity, Conversion time, 
Equity price at Conversion and Default time (Brigo et al., 2013 p.5).  
 
Gupta, Akuzawa and Nishiyama (2013) propose a convertible bond approach for pricing of 
CoCos. The authors emphasize that a practical pricing solution should allow for the CoCo 
instruments to be priced seamlessly and consistently with other existing derivatives, in a single 
framework. Gupta et al. (2013) suggest a framework that is an extension of existing derivative 
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pricing models used in practice, and that is theoretically consistent with existing frameworks 
such as Black-Scholes. The model used is therefore conceptually and technically similar to 
standard models for convertible bonds (Gupta et al., 2013). Gupta et al. (2013) argues that to 
effectively discuss the pricing of CoCos in terms of characteristics of the issuer, a concise 
framework to describe those characteristics in terms of CET1 ratio risk is needed. The approach  
outlined by Gupta et al. (2013) tries to capture all major risk factors affecting the CET1 ratio in 
three parameters: target, volatility, and resilience (mean reversion). To be able to capture risk 
with these three parameters that characterize a bank’s CET1 ratio risk, Gupta et al. (2013) 
propose an approximation of the CET1 ratio as the simplest mean-reverting process that 
fluctuates around the target CET1 ratio.  
  
A recent paper by Corcuera et al. (2013) uses an equity derivatives approach. In the paper 
Corcuera et al. (2013) looks at the issue of pricing CoCos under a smile conform model, where 
credit default swaps (CDS) quotes is used in addition for calibration of equity data. A key feature 
of this approach is that it goes beyond Black-Scholes modeling. This is performed by employing 
a smile conform model from the class of Lévy processes allowing for incorporation of fatter tails 
and jumps, contrasting it with the Black-Scholes setting (Corcuera et al., 2013). An argument for 
this approach put forward by the authors is that the payoff of CoCo instruments is very sensitive 
to tail risk; this makes Lévy models from a modeling perspective suitable to investigate price 
dynamics of CoCos. The CoCo bond is decomposed in a series of barrier-type derivatives to 
capture and model the effect of a trigger event, breaching of a barrier. In this study the triggering 
accounting ratio CT1 is replaced in a proxy model with an equivalent event where the stock price 
drops below a barrier, the reason for this is that CT1 cannot be observed continuously. The 
findings in the study suggest that this models developed better capture the intrinsic nature of 
these complex instruments (Corcuera et al., 2013). 
 
 
Spiegeleer and Schoutens (2011) can be seen as the founders of both the equity derivatives 
model and the credit derivatives model for pricing CoCos. Spiegeleer and Schoutens (2011) 
argue for the different approaches from the perspective of the investor. A fixed income investor 
is interested in the extra yield required over the risk free rate in order to feel comfortable 
handling the associated risk. An equity investor on the other hand would view the instrument as a 
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long position in the potential acquired shares at conversion and a barrier option approach would 
be suitable to price the instrument. The credit derivatives approach is based on the reduced form 
approach which is used for modeling the default probability of the bond. In the reduced form 
approach the spread of the bond is connected to its expected default probability and loss given 
default. The credit spread is calculated using the default intensity factor times one minus the 
recovery rate. Wilkens and Bethke (2014) argue for a fundamental problem with the credit 
derivatives approach, pointing out that the non predetermined stream of future coupon payments 
that the investor in a CoCo loses at conversion is difficult to incorporate into the model. The 
model in their opinion gives a quasi closed form solution for pricing CoCos. 
 
Wilkens and Bethke (2014) conclude that given the more straightforward approach in the equity 
derivatives model, they argue for this model to be best for practical implementation. The authors 
also evaluate the best model for hedging purposes, which can be seen as a strong quality 
indicator. The equity derivatives model also provides the best empirical result from this aspect. 
Wilkens and Bethke (2014) only consider a few of the currently issued CoCo and due to the 
limited time frame, so these results can only be seen as an early indication of the features of 
available pricing models. The above review of the different pricing approaches indicates that all 
are based on similar modeling of asset values, commonly used in pricing of other financial 
instruments, but differ in their application and specific choice of features.      
 
3.2 Incentive problems  
Koziol and Lawrenz (2012) wrote one of the first papers with a theoretical contribution that 
focuses on potential drawbacks of CoCos from distorted risk-taking incentives. The authors 
demonstrated that if considering incomplete contracts (manager-owners have discretion over 
banks investment risk), CoCos could potentially increase banks probability of financial distress. 
A more recent working paper by Berg and Kaserer (2014) discuss and analyze the effect of the 
conversion price of CoCo bonds on equity holders’ incentives. Berg and Kaserer (2014) find that 
a majority of all existing CoCos are designed in a way that creates a wealth transfer from the 
holders of CoCo bonds to equity holders at conversion of the security. This highlights that 
CoCos can have an impact on banks’ ex ante incentives. Berg and Kaserer (2014) use a set-up 
where conversion and default is triggered by the asset value as observed by regulatory 
authorities' falling below a predefined level. In this setting Berg and Kaserer’s (2014) findings 
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indicate that under imperfect information both the asset substitution and the debt overhang 
problem becomes enlarged. Banks have an incentive to increase the opaqueness of their assets if 
the conversion price of CoCos is set too high (Berg and Kaserer, 2014). 
 
The incentive effects of contingent convertible debt and incentives created by varying the two 
main design features, trigger level for conversion and the conversion ratio (dilution ratio at 
conversion), is analyzed in a working paper by Chen, Glasserman, Nouri and Pelger, (2013). 
CoCos that convert into equity is the focus and the authors examine how changes in the capital 
structure to include CoCos change the incentives for equity holders. Several interesting key 
findings are highlighted in this paper, one concerns the consequences of substituting straight debt 
with CoCos. Two opposite effects on firm value are identified, a reduced tax shield from CoCos 
(if coupon payments are not tax deductible) reduces firm value, but the effect of reduced default 
probability and reduced bankruptcy cost increases firm value. The net effect is increased firm 
value when CoCos replace straight debt. The reduction in bankruptcy risk increases debt value, 
this reduces rollover costs, which in turn increases the flow of dividends to equity holders (and 
hence equity value). Therefore equity holders have a positive incentive to issue CoCos. This 
effect combined with the desire to avoid dilution, can also lead equity holders to prefer less risky 
assets. Chen et al. (2013) also analyze the effect of increasing firm size by issuing CoCos while 
keeping other forms of debt fixed. In short, when the optimal default barrier is lower than the 
conversion trigger, the value of additional assets increases the distance to default and hence 
decreases the default risk. This increases the value of equity as decreased default risk reduces 
cost of rolling over straight debt. Chen et al. (2013) emphasizes that if coupons on CoCos is 
treated as tax deductible this increases equity value even further and lowers the cost of capital. 
Two other findings concern the debt overhang problem and asset substitution.  Chen et al. (2013) 
finds that CoCos can mitigate the debt overhang problem by creating two incentives for new 
equity investment when the firm’s asset value moves towards the trigger. If the CoCo holders 
receive a fixed number of shares at conversion, the value of issued equity to CoCo holders is 
largest at the trigger point, the incentive for shareholders to avoid conversion with additional 
equity infusion is then greatest above this point. Secondly, with tax deductible coupons for 
CoCos, it becomes optimal for shareholders to invest in the firm to maintain the valuable tax 
shield and avoid conversion. CoCos effect on asset substitution is identified as two fold 
according to Chen et al. (2013), firstly when CoCos reduce rollover costs of straight debt this can 
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result in incentives for equity holders to take on less risk especially when coupons are tax 
deductible. Secondly, because the cost of conversion for shareholders is lower if it occurs at a 
lower asset value, CoCos can create incentives for equity investor to increase exposure to tail-
risk.      
 
The paper by Hilscher and Raviv (2014) covers the effect of CoCos on risk taking and default 
probability. The findings by Hilscher and Raviv (2014) suggest that with carefully chosen 
parameters of CoCos (primarily conversion ratio) any motivation by shareholders to increase or 
decrease risk can be entirely eliminated. For a low conversion ratio (positive from existing 
shareholders point of view) shareholders have an incentive to increase asset risk. On the other 
side, a high conversion ratio leads to an incentive to reduce risk-taking. The findings of Hilscher 
and Raviv (2014) show that risk-taking incentives for a bank with appropriately designed CoCos 
are smaller compared to when CoCos are replaced with subordinated debt or additional equity in 
the capital structure. The authors also find that banks that issue contingent capital instead of 
subordinated debt are less likely to default. Risk shifting incentives for shareholder and managers 
of financial institutions that issues contingent convertible bonds is also the topic of Roggi, 
Giannozzi and Mibelli’s (2013) research. Roggi et al. (2013) finds that a contingent convertible 
capital with a trigger based on Basel III capital ratios and a conversion price at significant 
discount minimizes risk shifting incentives to for both equity holders and firm management. The 
authors argue that their proposed design is adequate to minimize the negative impact on bank 
stability of a solvency crisis, but also indicates that their proposal could generate a multiple 
equilibrium problem.   
 
Sundaresan and Wang (2010) is commonly cited as the first to have identified the multiple 
equilibria problem in CoCos with a market trigger. The multiplicity or absence of an equilibrium 
in contingent convertibles with a market trigger is a result of the use of a design aimed at a 
dilutive conversion ratio to induce incentives for bank managers and shareholders to issue equity 
before the trigger is breached. The authors find that in order to have a unique equilibrium a 
design with a market trigger and conversion ratio that produces no value transfer at conversion 
must be used. The multiple equilibria problem creates opposite motives for CoCo holders and 
equity holders, which can lead to manipulation of market prices when approaching the trigger 
level. Prescott (2011) also addresses this potential problem in the structure of CoCo bonds. Using 
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a trigger based on market price, Prescott (2011) argues that at conversion the value of equity also 
change leading to several equilibrium in the instrument. This would trigger conversion at times 
not desired and a possible solution suggested is to set the value of equity constant at conversion 
to create a single equilibrium.             
 
The topic of incentive effects of contingent convertible capital instruments is also discussed in a 
paper by Himmelberg and Tsyplakov (2012). The main emphasizes of the paper is that CoCos if 
properly designed can create strong incentives for banks to pursue conservative capital structures 
(Himmelberg & Tsyplakov 2012). Himmelberg and Tsyplakov (2012) show that CoCos with 
dilutive conversion terms for pre-existing shareholders can mitigate the ex-post conflict between 
shareholders and bondholders commonly known as the debt overhang problem. It is worth 
highlighting one detail emphasized by Himmelberg and Tsyplakov (2012), which are the 
reversed incentive effects for CoCos with a write-down feature. Himmelberg and Tsyplakov 
(2012) argues that CoCos with a write-down principal can induce shareholders to “burn assets” 
to accelerate the trigger conversion and write-down of the principal to generate a windfall wealth 
transfer from bondholders. This suggests that these types of CoCos could actually magnify the 
debt overhang problem, and hence magnify the debt overhang related incentives that can result in 
risk shifting, underinvestment and higher social cost at default (Himmelberg & Tsyplakov, 
2012). 
 
3.3 Proposed developments and enhancements of CoCo instruments 
As a way of understanding CoCos and potential pitfalls, and how the design and contractual 
structure affect the instrument, presented below is a summary of proposed development in 
academia. 
   
In a working paper, Coffee (2010) proposes a mandatory change in the capital structure of 
systemically significant financial institutions. Coffee’s (2010) proposal favor contingent capital 
and suggest a designed solution that addresses shareholder pressure as a key factor that leads 
issuing banks to take on excessive leverage. The contingent capital design outlined by Coffee 
(2010) has two significant characteristics that stand out. Firstly, a conversion ratio deliberately 
designed for diluting existing shareholders and protecting debt holders from a loss. Secondly, the 
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contingent capital security would convert into a fixed return preferred stock with cumulative 
arrearages and significant voting rights (Coffee, 2010). Coffee (2010) argues that interests of the 
after conversion preferred shareholders would be aligned with those of the bank’s debt holders, 
since the new preferred shares would have no share in residual earnings of the firm and only 
limited return. The significant voting rights given to preferred stockholders would act as an 
offsetting effect of the voting power of the risk-tolerant common shareholders. 
          
Pennacchi, Vermaelen and Wolff (2013) introduce and analyze a new form of contingent 
convertible bonds called Call Option Enhanced Reverse Convertible (COERC). COERC 
instruments are a variant of CoCos designed to address criticism of standard forms of CoCos. 
The design of COERCs introduces two main characteristics that distinguish them from other 
CoCos with market value triggers. Firstly, if automatic conversion is triggered (trigger based on 
a market value capital ratio) a large number of new shares would be issued to COERC holders 
and as a result existing shareholders of the bank would tend to be heavily diluted (Pennacchi et 
al., 2013). According to Pennacchi et al. (2013) the market value of the newly issued shares 
would likely exceed the bonds’ par value (conversion price is set significantly below the trigger 
price), this would give the COERC holders a capital gain and existing shareholder a capital loss. 
The second main characteristic allows existing shareholder to avoid this dilution of their capital 
as they are given the right (option) to purchase the newly issued shares at an exercise price equal 
to the par value of the COERC bond (Pennacchi et al., 2013). With this structure COERCs are 
not loss absorbing instruments, but instead let equity holders “bail-out” debt holders, the design 
encourage banks to issue equity and repay debt in risk of financial distress (Pennacchi et al., 
2013).                   
In a paper by Di Girolamo, Campolongo, De Spiegeleer and Schoutens (2012) the concept of a 
contingent conversion convertible bond (“CoCoCo”) is introduced. The authors describe the new 
instrument as a more complex structure with a hybrid bond that is itself a combination of two 
hybrids, a convertible bond and a contingent convertible bond (CoCo). The CoCoCo contains the 
same automatic loss absorbing mechanism that through conversion, if the bank fails to meet a 
minimum capital level, recapitalizes the bank. The feature that distinguishes the CoCoCo bond is 
feature that gives the investor an optional conversion possibility (Di Girolamo et al., 2012). The 
CoCoCo investors can convert the bond into a pre-determined amount of shares in case of good 
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share price performance, this optional conversion into shares introduces a profitable upside for 
the holder of the CoCoCo in good states of the world (Di Girolamo et al., 2012). 
In a paper by Corcuera, De Spiegeleer, Fajardo, Jönsson and Schoutens (2014) yet another new 
type of CoCo is introduced and analyzed. The new instrument is Coupon Cancellable CoCos 
(“CoCa CoCos”), the coupon cancellable feature allows for cancellation of coupons during the 
lifetime of the bond (Corcuera et al., 2014). By introducing cancellable coupons to the CoCo 
structure the authors address the undesirable so-called death-spiral-effect which equity 
conversion CoCos can suffer from. According to Corcuera et al. (2014) the death-spiral-effect 
can be induced by investors actively hedging the equity risk, unintentionally forcing the 
conversion by making the share price decrease and eventually trigger conversion of the CoCo. 
Adding the coupon cancellation to a typical CoCo with equity conversion allows for an 
automatic cancellation of coupon payments (one or several) before conversion (Corcuera et al, 
2014). In this setting the coupon is paid only if a share price trigger process stays above a certain 
limit during the time period until maturity of the CoCo. Spiegeleer and Schoutens (2013) suggest 
another approach to mitigate the death-spiral-effect involving using multiple triggers. Issuing 
several CoCos with smaller size and individual triggers would create less sensitivity of change in 
equity price compared to one large issue since less money is linked to a specific event. 
 
3.4 Market discipline 
In instruments like CoCos and other SND, to be able to understand the underlying risk of such 
instruments the most important aspect is to analyze the risk of that the bank is not able to fulfill 
its obligations to investors. Previous research has looked at the information content of accounting 
variables closely related to the underlying riskiness of the banks compared to market based risk 
measures such as SND and CDS spreads. 
The paper by Flannery and Ellis (1992) is considered a first generation study in the field of 
market discipline. They define market discipline as “[…] the process by which informed market 
investors gather and evaluate information about a firm´s activities and prospects, and 
incorporate this information into its traded securities” (Flannery & Ellis, 1992, p.1356). Their 
paper examine the relationship between the riskiness of US banks and the Certificate of Deposit 
(CD) rates, concluding that a significant default premium is paid and does not reflect market 
discipline. The study is among the first to analyze if the riskiness of the banks really is reflected 
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in spreads in the debt market. Similar to Gorton and Santomero (1989) both these studies finds 
indications but not significant evidence of market discipline in the debt market when looking at 
accounting based risk measures to subordinated debt spreads. Further, Gorton and Santomero 
(1989) also question the linearity assumption between subordinated debt and the banks risk, and 
use a contingent claims valuation approach of SND instead. Arguably regressing the spread of 
SND on risk indicators could in that sense give a false result.    
Flannery and Sorescu (1996) study the subordinated debenture yields and accounting risk 
measures to find evidence of market discipline. They conclude that the market discipline among 
investors is more efficient in times of less regulatory guarantees for the banks, higher risk makes 
the investors more incentivized to account for non-market risk indicators. However no evidence 
of market discipline was significantly proven in this study. These findings are interesting for our 
study since the recent crisis (GFC) and the development of CoCos are closely linked to the effort 
among government to become less tied to “too big to fail” banks. The effectiveness of market 
discipline in this sense could arguably have become more efficient after the crisis when a 
increase number of governments introduce non-bailout policies (less regulatory discipline). 
 
Covitz et al. (2004) takes the debate of regulatory effect further and evaluate previous studies in 
the field to see if their arguments hold. One interesting aspect of this paper is that the correlation 
of accounting risk measures and subordinated bond prices was quite weak before 1989. This has 
been recognized in previous studies, but Covitz et al. (2004) conclude that the SND investors had 
some sensitivity before 1989 but became increasingly sensitive after that year since a deposit 
insurance were implemented in the US by the FDIC. Similar to Flannery and Sorescu (1996) this 
effect is explained by the regulation in the US. In the late 1980s, bank regulators made it clear to 
subordinated debt holders that they would not be fully protected in times of distress. This led to 
an increased relationship between SND yields and the riskiness of the banks. Further, Covitz et 
al. (2004) conclude that the market discipline is significant in the US market, and with a decrease 
in implicit guarantees follows an increase of the risk sensitivity from investors to accounting risk 
indicators. Sironi (2003) similarly finds that SND investors are sensitive to the riskiness of the 
issuing bank. More sensitive in the later part of the 90s following a decrease in too big to fail 
guarantees. Sironi (2003) also found that public sector banks differ from private sector banks, 
since publicly (government owned or guaranteed institutions) have more protection and hence 
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market discipline is less apparent. This paper use data from the European market which is useful 
as a reference for our study. 
 
Krishnan, Ritchken and Thomson (2005) evaluates if issuing risky debt enhances the monitoring 
of risks and increases the risk control in the bank. Intuitively, if the markets price of the debt 
issued reflects the underlying risk factors in the firm (market discipline), the incentive for banks 
to take on excessive risk would hurt them through increasing cost of capital. Krishnan et al. 
(2005) argue that bank specific information such as accounting risk indicators is highly relevant 
for CDS spreads, but considering the measurement points in time, quarterly changes only have a 
weak relationship with changes in the CDS spread since including much noise from the market. 
This study uses CDS spreads as the dependent variable, nevertheless its findings could be 
important to consider for our study since more observations not always add additional 
explanatory power.      
 
So far most of the previous work in this area of research reflects that in recent years more 
evidence of market discipline has been proven to be significant by using SND spreads. 
Forssbӕck (2011) argue that pure accounting based or market based risk measures is not optimal 
for measuring bank risks. Forssbӕck (2011) argue for accounting based risk measures to be 
considered superior to market measures in finding the actual riskiness of the bank. However, the 
market based variables could have a complementary role in explaining the risk, and therefore a 
mix of accounting and market measures could be optimal. Gropp et.al, (2006) finds similar 
results when examining ratings of banks, concluding that market and accounting measures have a 
complementary effect. 
Many of the studies related to the concept of market discipline uses SND or CDS spreads/prices 
and does not cover CoCos, which is the instrument that is the focus of this paper. However the 
underlying characteristics of CoCos and other SNDs is quite similar since both are built as a 
bond, the only difference is the forced loss absorption ability using equity conversion or write 
down in CoCos, which is not used in SNDs or other hybrid instruments. Further, with the 
previous research in the area we would like to present the transition of non-correlation to 
significant correlation of accounting based indicators of risk to market traded instruments such as 
SND and CDS spreads. If the spread of CoCos is considered to be similar to SNDs in non-
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distress times, a natural step is to use a similar approach as these past studies using SNDs, and 
evaluate the explanatory variables behind the movement of the spread of CoCos. 
 
The articles discussed above use different models and variables to test for market discipline, on 
the next page in table 3.1 a summary is presented to provide a better understanding of how these 
test were performed. The table includes a range of articles taking similar approaches to 
investigate if evidence of market discipline can be observed in SND spreads. 
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Table 3.1 Summary of methods in previous research testing for market discipline 
 
Author Name of article Summary Explanatory variables Control variables Model to 
test- 
Modifications R-square 
Flannery and 
Soresco (1996) 
Evidence of Bank 
Market Discipline in 
Subordinated 
Debenture Yields: 
1983-1991 
Test debenture 
yields during 83-91. 
Not significant 
results but strong 
indication of market 
discipline  
Nonaccrual loans to total 
asset, accruing loans past 
due 90 days or more to 
total assets, other real 
estate/ total assets. D/E 
(market value of equity) 
LN(TA), Year 
dummy 
Panel 
regression 
with period 
fixed 
effects  
Own calculation 
of spread and 
compare it to 
actual spreads.    
address the 
problem of 
nonlinearity but 
not mitigated. 
R-square of 
0.465 using only 
accounting risk 
indicators 
 
DeYoung et al. 
(2001) 
The Information 
Content of Bank Exam 
Ratings 
and Subordinated Debt 
Prices 
Supervisor exams 
add additional 
information about 
risks. (regulatory vs 
market discipline) 
Vector of financial 
information, private 
insider information, 
lagged spread 
Quarterly dummy, 
LN(TA), ROA, D/E 
(book value).non 
accruing loans/TA , 
loans past due 
ninety days+/TA. 
other real estate/TA 
Ordered 
logit 
regression.  
Spread calculated 
as in Flannery and 
Sorescu 1996. 
Also use fixed 
effects. 
Adjusted R-
square of  0.834 
using spread 
(t+1) 
Jagtiani et al. 
(2002) 
The effect of credit risk 
on bank and bank 
holding company bond 
yields: Evidence from 
the post-FDICIA 
period. 
Issuing subordinated 
debt can enhance 
market monitoring. 
Examine the post 
FDICIA period. 
Leverage, Non 
performing loans, ROA, 
insured deposits to total 
deposits at banks, 
LN TA, Issuer 
dummy 
Panel 
regression 
with 
control of 
non 
linearity 
and 
alternative 
risk 
measures. 
Scale variables to 
account for 
capture any 
nonlinear risk 
relations, 
Alternative 
interactive 
specifications are 
estimated.   
R-square of 0.6 
using accounting 
risk measures. 
Sironi (2003) Testing for Market 
Discipline in the 
European 
Banking Industry: 
Evidence from 
Subordinated 
Debt Issues 
Support evidence of 
market discipline in 
European market, 
related to regulatory 
environment.  
D/E (book value), ROA , 
net loans /TA , equity 
investments/TA, liquid 
assets to customers' 
deposits and short term 
funding, loan loss 
reserves to total loans 
Maturity, year, 
amount, country, 
Currency, Public or 
private, Total assets. 
Panel 
regression 
(linear) 
Include interactive 
term  to capture 
nonlinearity 
R-square of 
0.675 for 
accounting 
variables alone. 
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Covitz et al. 
(2004) 
A Reconsideration of 
the Risk Sensitivity of 
U.S. Banking 
Organization 
Subordinated Debt 
Spreads: A Sample 
Selection Approach 
Test previous studies 
in market discipline 
to see if their 
arguments hold. 
Comparing time 
spans and argues for 
evidence of market 
discipline in less 
regulatory times. 
Non Accruing loans/TA, 
accruing loans past due 
ninety days+/TA, real 
estate/TA , Callable, 
maturity with range, 
coupon frequency, issue 
size 
LN assets, issue size OLS with 
the spread 
calculated 
with 
Newton-
Ralphson 
iterative 
method  
Wald, heckman 
test with mills 
ratio to address 
selection problem 
R-square of 0.31 
for post-FDICIA 
sample 
Krishnan et al. 
(2005) 
Monitoring and 
Controlling Bank Risk: 
Does 
Risky Debt Help? 
Use three factor 
model to construct 
credit-spread curves 
, look at risk 
monitoring for both 
banks and nonbanks 
without clear 
evidence of market 
discipline since 
noise in market data. 
Firms specific (ROA, 
Loan assets, Non 
performing loans, Net 
charge offs, Leverage), 
Market variables. 
(Growth rate in industrial 
production, S&P buy and 
hold return CRSP 
Decreases 5-year 
Treasury yields, Slope of 
yield curve (10 year 
minus 2 year), VIX), 
Liquidity variables. 
(Relative trade frequency, 
TED spread, New issue, 
Relative trade size) 
Buy and hold stock 
returns, BOPEC 
ratings for BHCs, 
CAMEL ratings for 
banks, 
Panel 
regression, 
three factor 
model and 
own 
calculation
s. 
Three factor 
model, forecasts 
with ordered logit 
regression models 
 R-square of 
around 0.4 for 
risk indicators 
Gropp et al. 
(2006) 
Equity and Bond 
Market Signals as 
Leading Indicators of 
Bank Fragility 
Predict default 
(market/bond signals 
to rating ) 
using the percentile 
ranking of capital, 
problem loans, 
cost/income and ROE to 
form a score 
Ratings from rating 
agencies. 
Logit 
model  
Hazard estimation 
 
Pseudo R-square 
0.49. 
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3.5 Risk indicators 
Commonly used variables in measurement of bank risks can be divided into two main categories, 
accounting-based and market-based risk indicators. The accounting risk indicators that are most 
common, and presented in several of the previously reviewed articles, are: 
 
ROA (Return on assets) (see, e.g., DeYoung et al., 2001; Flannery & Sorescu, 1996; Gropp et 
al., 2006; Sironi, 2003) 
Leverage (D/E) (see, e.g., Covitz et al., 2004; DeYoung et al., 2001; Flannery & Sorescu, 1996; 
Gropp et al., 2006; Sironi, 2003) 
Non-Performing loans (Non-performing loans/total assets) (see, e.g., Covitz et al., 2004; 
DeYoung et al., 2001; Flannery & Sorescu, 1996; Gorton & Santomero, 1989; Gropp et al., 
2006; Sironi, 2003) 
 
Table 3.2 Accounting and market based risk indicators 
   
Market-based risk indicators  Accounting-based risk indicators 
 Capital-structure-based  
Equity return volatility (various definitions)  Leverage, or capital ratio (various definitions, 
e.g. equity/total assets, liabilities/market or 
book value of equity). 
Equity return volatility   
Abnormal equity returns (market model)  Debt or deposit structure 
Beta (CAPM or market model)   
Other, equity-based Loan- or asset-structure-
based 
 
  Non-performing loans or similar (non-
accruing 
Primary-market spreads on subordinated 
notes and bonds 
 loans, loans past due, etc)/total assets 
  Loan-loss provisions or loan-loss 
reserves/total 
Secondary-market spreads on subordinated 
notes and bonds Interest rate spreads on large 
certificates of deposit (CDs) 
 loans or total assets 
  Other, loan structured 
Other, debt-based  Non-loan asset structure 
 Profitability-based  
  Return on assets 
  Earnings volatility 
  Other, accounting-based 
 
(Forssbaeck 2011, p 55) 
 
 
D. Iseklint & D. Bengtsson 
42 
Since our approach is to analyze a new kind of debt-based market risk indicator we are interested 
in seeing if some of the changes in accounting based risk measures is reflected in the spread, 
arguably indicating evidence of market discipline. As outlined in the Table 3.2, it is most 
common to use leverage, non-performing loans or a similar measure, and return on assets or 
earning volatility, as traditional accounting based risk indicators. Rating agencies such as 
Moody’s use similar measures in the section of financial fundamentals to provide a credit rating 
on global banks (Bauer et al., 2013) Moody's also includes measures related to the banks risk 
weighted assets (RWA) and measures on the Tier 1 ratio. Arguably, these measures can add 
additional information since the structure of the CoCo is closely related to the Basel framework 
and its risk measures. In addition, Covitz et al. (2004) examines the explanatory variables behind 
the SND spread for large US banks during 1985-2002, and as inputs to the regression the bond 
specific features are used as independent variables. Our paper could arguably use a similar 
approach, since the structure of CoCos issued to this date is quite issue specific and therefore it 
could be difficult to recalculate each issue to make them comparable. 
DeYoung et al. (2001) explain the CAMEL-framework, which is a common concept when 
evaluating the risk of banks by regulatory agencies in the US. CAMEL stands for: Capital 
Adequacy, Asset quality, Management, Earnings and Liquidity. This framework gives a rating 
from 1 to 5, with 1 indicating strong performance and practices, and 5 critically deficient 
performances. This is a rating reflecting both public information and private on site information 
received by the regulatory supervisor. In most corporate finance studies a common problem is to 
measure the role of management for example for the riskiness of banks. The aspects of the 
CAMEL framework and non-financial risk measures used by rating agencies, is important to 
consider when it comes to choosing the explanatory variables for the spread in the CoCo issues. 
Forssbӕck (2011) also addresses this aspect and call it the unobservability problem, which is 
important to remember as a limitation for all studies in this field since it makes it difficult to 
generalize the result as evidence of market discipline. Having these concepts and previous 
research in mind, to address the wide variety in the characteristics of the issues and also the main 
underlying risk indicators commonly used for closely related instruments such as SNDs, a 
combination of explanatory variables are relevant to use. This approach would investigate if the 
investors in CoCos are primarily interested in the quality of the assets of the underlying bank, or 
more concerned about contract specific details.      
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As presented in the theoretical background and previous literature of CoCos, CoCos are still in 
the stage of development with no standardization in pricing models, and articles with new 
modifications are presented regularly discussing how to mitigate some of the pitfalls in the 
original structure. However, the original features of CoCos have some items that always will be a 
part of each instrument, such as the regulatory capital treatment (Additional Tier 1 or Tier 2), if 
the loss absorption mechanism is conversion into equity in distressed times or if the principal 
will be written down. Further, the issue specification express if the CoCo is callable at the 
issuers’ discretion, type and frequency of the coupons, and if the bond has a maturity date or is 
perpetual. Lastly all these instruments need to include a trigger level or a description if the 
trigger is to be set by the local regulatory agencies.  All these features are included in the 
prospectus of the issues, and to be able to compare them in a good way these need to be included 
as explanatory variables in a regression. Previous studies covering market discipline use the 
spread, that is yield to maturity (YTM) minus the yield of a comparable government bond, 
instead of the observed price of the instrument, and compare these to different risk indicators. 
Our empirical study takes a similar stand and uses the spread of issued CoCos as the observed 
market-based variable. The foundation of our empirical research is to evaluate if evidence of 
market discipline through analysis of spreads of CoCo bonds. Market discipline is our main 
theory, however an understanding of previous research within the field of CoCos is vital to be 
able to understand the structure of the instruments, and the main characteristics reflected in 
different pricing approaches, but also potential incentives problems that could distort a fair 
market price. 
Overall, this framework leads to the development of the hypotheses that will be the key of our 
empirical investigation. Since no standardization in the contracts are present, the hypotheses will 
be constructed to both, investigate the possibility of evidence of market discipline using 
accounting risk indicators, and considering issue specific features of the instruments influence on 
market spreads for the instruments. Arguably, a change in risk indicators could have more or less 
impact on the spread of issued CoCos depending on contract specific details.      
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3.6 Hypotheses 
From the literature review and theoretical background of both CoCos and market discipline, we 
construct the following hypotheses. 
 
First hypothesis: 
The first hypothesis will test if return on assets (ROA) has a significant correlation with the 
spread of CoCos. Along with an increase in the profitability of the bank, a decrease in spread 
could be expected since the risk is decreasing. 
 
H0 - Return on assets do not have a significant correlation to the spread of CoCos. 
H1 - Return on assets have a significant correlation to the spread of CoCos. 
 
Second hypothesis: 
The second hypothesis will test if non-performing loans to total assets has a significant 
correlation with the spread of CoCos. Higher non-performing loans are expected to increase the 
risk of default and with that an increased spread. 
 
H0 - Non-performing loans to total assets do not have a significant correlation to the 
spread of CoCos. 
H1 - Non-performing loans to total assets have a significant correlation to the spread of 
CoCos. 
 
Third hypothesis: 
The third hypothesis will test if a significant correlation can be found between leverage (D/E) 
and the spread of CoCos. Change in leverage could be either positive or negative depending on 
the individual banks business profile. Higher leverage is not always interpreted as a negative 
indication.    
 
H0 - Leverage (D/E) do not have a significant correlation to the spread of CoCos. 
H1 - Leverage (D/E) have a significant correlation to the spread of CoCos. 
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Fourth hypothesis: 
The fourth hypothesis will test if the Tier 1 ratio has a significant correlation with the spread of 
CoCos. Higher Tier 1 ratio signals lower risk and arguably could result in a decreased spread. 
The trigger is usually linked to this type of capital ratio. 
 
H0 - The Tier 1 ratio have not a significant correlation to the spread of CoCos. 
H1 - The Tier 1 ratio have a significant correlation to the spread of CoCos. 
 
Fifth hypothesis: 
The fifth hypothesis will test if any of the contracts specific variables; regulatory treatment, 
callability, trigger level, perpetual, coupon frequency, coupon type and loss absorption 
mechanism have a significant effect on the spread of the CoCos. 
 
H0 – None of the contracts specific variables have a significant correlation to the spread 
of CoCos. 
H1 – At least one the contracts specific variables have a significant correlation to the 
spread of CoCos. 
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4. Method and Data 
 The chapter will start with a description of CoCo issues to date and we will continue by 
presenting our sample and discuss the data collection process and its limitations. Further, the 
methods used to test our hypotheses will be presented and potential modifications discussed. 
 
4.1 CoCo issuance to date 
The CoCo market is still relatively small compared to other SND, however fast growing when 
considering the last few years issuance. All the numbers below are based on our collected data 
reaching to end of January 2014. The sample contains 118 issues which is the entire sample 
before limitations for non-banks and missing values. Since 2009, $ 109 billion worth of CoCos 
have been issued. (Calculations based on the exchange rate for each issue at 2014-01-01, see 
appendix 5).  
 
Figure 4.1 Issued CoCos in million USD 
 
As shown in the figure above, the increasing volume of issuance of this instrument is quite 
substantial. The entire amount in 2009 consists of the issued CoCos by Lloyds in the middle of 
the financial crisis. Further, the following years displays a significant increase starting with 
approximately $5 billion in 2010 and last year the issued amount reached $40 billion. All the 
exchange rates are from the first day of 2014, so the numbers reflect the issue value in early 
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2014, however this explains the interest and potential bright future of this product following the 
last years development. (See appendix 1 for more detailed information.) 
 
Figure 4.2 CoCo features constructed as dummy variables 
 
 
The figure above describes the contract features of the issued CoCos covered in this paper. Key 
trends in this data are that a majority of issues are not perpetual, and have trigger that is the 
typical 5.125% or lower. Further, a majority of the issued CoCo instruments have one or several 
of the following characteristics, issued under Tier 2, a fixed coupon type and quarterly or 
semiannually coupon payments. Due to the lack of standardization of the contracts the 
information of specific issue details was difficult to collect, most clearly noticeable in the 
missing information on the trigger level. 
A recent trend however is to set the trigger level at 5.125% and use loss absorption through 
write-downs. This has become more popular since the demand for these instrument 
characteristics is high, since institutional investors seeking yield without the desire to become 
shareholders. In many cases fixed income investors are prevented by their investment mandate to 
hold securities that convert into equity. (See appendix 2 for more detailed information.) 
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Figure 4.3 Issuance currency during 2009Q1-2014Q1 
 
The currency denomination of the issued bonds varies among the issues, with a majority in USD, 
EUR and GBP. The instruments issued by Lloyds in 2009 was primarily in GBP, with the rest 
almost equally distributed between USD and EUR. Looking at the yearly development, a trend 
seems to be an increase in EUR and USD denominated issues, which is expected with regard to 
their leading position among global currencies. (See appendix 1 for more detailed information.) 
 
Figure 4.4 Number of issues by firm 
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The issued CoCos come from 49 different firms with Lloyds accountable for the most amount of 
issues. However since 2009 Lloyds have not issued any more instruments and the market is quite 
diversified with a large number of different firms. Other firms in the top in number of issued 
CoCos are, Barclays, Credit Agricole and Credit Suisse with 4, 4 and 9 issues respectively. All 
firms are available in appendix 1. 
 
Figure 4.5 Rating on issued CoCos 
 
In our sample, 71 of 118 issues have a assigned rating by S&P, with a majority being rated BBB-
. The figure above present the interval of the rated CoCos so far, however since the instrument 
was first introduced in 2009, and due to a complex structure, rating agencies have expressed 
concerns about how to give a fair rating of the product (Bauer et al., 2013). (See appendix 1 for 
more detailed information.) 
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Figure 4.6 Issues by country  
 
Presented above is the issuer's domicile indicating a clear majority of firms from Great Britain 
(GB), with 37% of the issues to date. This number is influenced by the large portion of issues by 
Lloyds in 2009. Further, Ireland (IE), France (FR) and Switzerland (CH) represent 22% of the 
issues. The geographical diversification of the other firms (41%) is well spread out with the 
remaining firms standing for 1 to 5% of the issues each (See appendix 1 for more detailed 
information.) 
 
4.2 Sample and selection procedure 
The initial search for issued contingent convertible capital instruments was performed through 
the websites AllonHybrids (2014) and ContingentConvertibles (2014) and in previous research 
papers. The first website is managed by Schoutens which together with De Spiegeleer are one of 
the most frequent authors of academic research articles covering CoCos. The other website is 
managed by a CFA charter holder with expertise in contingent convertibles and that is associated 
with Dollarhane, a private asset management firm located in London. These sources were a 
necessity, since no index for CoCos could be found in the financial databases Thomson Reuters 
Eikon, S&P Capital IQ and Thomson Reuters DataStream. According to an article from January 
17, 2014 (Durand, 2014), Bank of America Merrill Lynch is in the process of creating a 
Contingent Capital Index with the ticker COCO. The index contains 48 bonds, including only 
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securities rated by Moody’s, S&P or Fitch with a capital dependent conversion feature. The 
article indicates that this is the first index to track performance of all publicly issued contingent 
capital. Screening in Eikon under the asset class convertible fixed income bonds provided a list 
called “Tier 1 CoCos”, including 52 issues. Screening in Capital IQ and DataStream indicated 
that CoCos can show up under categories such as hybrid capital, convertible bonds, corporate 
debenture or preferred stock. This aggravated the screening process for issued CoCos. The 
sources above provided an indicative sample of 118 issued CoCos since the introduction by 
Lloyds in 2009. The definition of CoCos or CoCo bonds vary in previous empirical research, in 
some cases researchers only considers equity conversion CoCos (“traditional” CoCos) as being 
eligible for inclusion in the sample to be researched. In this paper the choice was made to include 
all available CoCos irrespectively of the loss absorption mechanism, including both equity 
conversation and principal write-down instruments. The primary reason for not initially 
excluding either write-down or equity conversion CoCos, is simply the limited data availability 
due to the relatively young market for these financial instruments. Through this first search 
process all ISIN numbers for the issued instruments was obtained. With the individual ISIN 
numbers at hand information about specific issuer could be collected. The sample contains 49 
unique issuers, including banks, insurance companies, reinsurance companies and a building 
society. CoCos issued by non-banks were then excluded from the sample, to avoid distortion by 
industry specific differences in both issuers and the issued CoCos. This is in line with Avdjiev et 
al. (2013), who use a similar delimitation when testing the correlation between CoCos spreads, 
CDS and subordinated debt spreads. After the exclusion of non-bank issuers, 41 unique issuers 
are left in the sample. The sample quarters are 2009-Q1 to 2014-Q1, limited by the possibility to 
obtain reported accounting risk indicators for the individual banks. Appendix 1 provides more 
detailed information about the sample (issued CoCos, unique issuers, ISIN number). 
Since no clear regulatory framework have been established in the US to handle these instrument 
the sample contains mostly European banks and some banks from South America and Asia.  The 
data sample is the same as presented in 4.1, except the exclusion of the non-bank firms. (See 
appendix 1.)  
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4.3 Data collection 
The initial search for issued CoCos, as described above, involved collection of issue-specific 
ISIN numbers to enable further search for public prospectus for each issued CoCo instrument. 
By using the ISIN number, searches in the financial databases Thomson Reuters Eikon, S&P 
Capital IQ and Thomson Reuters DataStream generated pdf-files with detailed public prospectus 
for the majority of all CoCos. In some cases prospectus and issue details had to be obtained 
through the issuers website or other publicly available sources. The more cumbersome part of the 
data collection process involved screening for issue details in individual prospectus, to obtain 
variables characterizing different aspects of the CoCo instruments. Bank-specific (issuer) data 
collection was performed through primarily S&P Capital IQ, and if needed, complementary 
information from publicly available company reports was obtained.  The following section 
describes the variables used in the analysis, explains some of them in more detail and develops 
the data collection process further. 
 
 
4.4 Data 
Accounting risk indicators that have been used in similar studies on other subordinated debt will 
be used in this paper as well. The most frequent measures, as discussed previously, are ROA, 
leverage and non-performing loans, to describe the risk of individual banks (see e.g. Covitz et al., 
2004; DeYoung et al., 2001; Flannery & Sorescu, 1996; Gorton & Santomero, 1989; Gropp et 
al., 2006; Sironi, 2003). These are the core variables that will be used in this paper to find 
evidence of market discipline. Furthermore, since CoCos is regulated in the Basel III framework, 
either the Tier 1 and Core Tier 1 ratio will be included as explanatory variables. As mentioned 
before these ratios are also used by rating agencies in their assessment of banks in assigning a 
credit rating for global banks. The issue specific variables are based on the previous theoretical 
framework describing the core features of CoCos both in aspects of pricing and dynamics of the 
structure. Krishnan et al. (2005) argue for the use of yearly observations since the underlying risk 
indicators shows limited change between quarters. However, our time frame cover a period of 
financial turbulence and due to indication of significant changes between quarters in the sample, 
quarterly measurement points are used for all data. 
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4.4.1 Accounting variables 
Leverage (LEV) – Total book value of liabilities over book value of equity, all of the firms are 
not public so market values of equity will not be used. The information was collected using S&P 
Capital IQ with quarterly measurements. We manually calculated the ratio using total liabilities 
over total equity since the ratio could not be retrieved directly from the software.  
Return on assets (ROA) – Net income over total assets expressed in percentages. Data collected 
using S&P Capital IQ with the return directly available so no additional calculations were 
performed. 
Non-performing loans ratio (NON PERF LOANS) - Non-performing loans over total assets 
expressed in percentages. Data collected using S&P Capital IQ with a predefined ratio available. 
Tier 1 ratio (TIER1) - The Tier 1 Capital Ratio represents Tier 1 Capital as a percentage of 
Total Risk-Weighted Assets of the Bank. Data from S&P Capital IQ. 
Core Tier 1 ratio (CTIER1) - Core Tier 1 Capital Ratio is expressed as a percentage of Core 
Tier 1 capital over risk-weighted assets (RWA).  
 
(See appendix 6 for the definitions in S&P Capital IQ of the collected variables.) 
 
4.4.2 Issue specific variables 
Regarding the contract specific variables, they will also be included as explanatory (dummy) 
variables. We have chosen to use the following: 
 
Loss absorption (LOSS ABSORPTION) – 1 if equity conversion, 0 if write down (fully or 
partly). Data collected from each individual prospectus.   
Trigger level (TRIGGER LEVEL) – 1 if equal or lower than 5.125% (more widely used after 
changes in the Basel accords), 0 if higher trigger level than 5.125%. Data collected from each 
individual prospectus. 
Coupon frequency (COUPON FREQ)– 1 if Annual, 0 if semiannual or quarterly. Data 
collected using Reuter Eikon with searches by ISIN number for each issue. 
Callable (CALLABLE Y/N)– Do the issuer have the ability to redeem before maturity. 1 if YES, 
0 if NO. Data collected using Reuter Eikon with searches by ISIN number for each issue. 
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Perpetual (PERPETUAL Y/N)– Does the instrument have a predefined maturity date or not. 1 if 
YES, 0 if NO. Data collected using Reuter Eikon with searches in ISIN number for each issue. 
Regulatory treatment (REGT AT1ORT2) – 1 if treated as Tier 1, 0 of treated as Tier 2 capital. 
Data collected from each individual prospectus. 
Coupon type (COUPON TYPE) - 1 if fixed coupon or “Floating: fixed then floating”, 0 if 
floating or defined as Variable: Step Up/Step down in Eikon. Data collected using Reuter Eikon 
with searches by ISIN number for each issue. 
 
 
4.4.3 Control variables 
Since some of the effect of the spread and risk measures can be due to the size of the firms and 
the seasonal effects from year to year, a number of control variables will be used in order to 
correct for some of these variations.  Flannery and Sorescu (1996) use both the natural logarithm 
of total assets and years as control variables. Sironi (2003) use maturity, year, amount, country, 
public or private, and total assets as control variables. Following these past studies, a number of 
suitable control variables are presented below. 
 
LN Total assets (LN TA) - Natural logarithm of total assets. Larger firms can be considered 
more safe. Since the accounting variables are presented in the issuers local currency, total assets 
needs to be converted into a default currency in order to make them comparable. We have 
chosen to use EUR as the default currency since most of the issuers use EUR in their accounting 
statements. Data from S&P capital IQ choosing EUR instead of local currency before  
downloading the data. 
LN Return on share price (LN RETURN) - Natural logarithm of market share price returns 
collected from each bank when available and then recalculated using quarterly changes. 
Forssbӕck (2011) argue for market indicators as a complementary measures of the banks risk. 
Further, this variable will be included to address possible interests from investors to follow the 
share price movement since several issues has an equity conversion feature. Each measured in 
local currency and data collected using Reuters datastream. 
LN Issue size (LN ISSUE SIZE) - Natural logarithm of the issued size. All issues recalculated 
to EUR using 2014-01-01 exchange rate. FX Data collected from Datastream. (See appendix 5 
for all datastream codes for each exchange rate). 
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Public or private (PUBLIC OR PRIVATE Y/N) - 1 if stock price available (Public), 0 if not 
(Private) 
Year – Changes in for example regulation between the years could affect the spreads. By using 
period fixed effect in Eviews the dummies for each year will be constructed in the software and 
not manual designed. Arguably the change between years can be affected of a change in the 
overall riskiness of the business environment for banks, by introduction a fixed effect on the time 
dimension macro fluctuations will not distort the results and the measurement will be based on 
the change for firms specific risk measures and the differences in features of the issues.   
 
 
4.4.4 Spread 
CoCo Spread (COCO SPREAD) - The yield of the issued CoCos was collected using both 
Reuters Eikon and S&P Capital IQ since these software had complementary information on the 
issues. The collected data from Eikon covered the yield of some of the instruments. Using 
Capital IQ the yield was expressed as “yield to worst” meaning that the lowest yield when 
comparing both puts and calls and yield to maturity is picked and represent the lowest possible 
yield that an investor will realize (CFA Institute, 2013, p.503). Each of the yields corresponds to 
the yield at the end day of each quarter, last March, June, September and December each year. 
This is a conservative yield however no other data was available and compared to some of the 
“actual” yields from Eikon, these only differed marginally.  
The data for yield to maturity are collected from the secondary market. Potentially, poor liquidity 
of the secondary market for CoCos could have an effect on spreads. The spread of illiquid 
instrument could change differently due to the low trading volume, and hence not correspond to 
the actual change in other explanatory variables. Sironi (2003) emphasize the use of primary 
market spreads over secondary market, as they can be a more accurate measure of the actual cost 
of debt for the issuer and of the premiums demanded by issuers. However, in this case we are left 
to use data from the secondary markets as it is the available source for us.    
Since the spread corresponds to the yield of the issue minus a comparable government bond in 
terms of maturity, some bond yields was collected using Datastream. Sironi (2003) argue for the 
use of government bonds corresponding to the currency of the issue. Following this approach, 10 
year bonds from Denmark, Euro area, Japan, Switzerland, UK, and US was collected and 
compared to the currency in with the CoCos was issued to determine the spread. An example, an 
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issue in EUR would use the yield minus the redemption yield from a Euro zone bond for each 
quarter to determine the spread. The redemption yield is similar to the YTM measure but also 
include the gain/loss at maturity realize (CFA Institute, 2013, p.505). Some of the currencies lack 
suitable government bonds in this case the US redemption yield was used as a benchmark.  
 
4.5 Methods to test hypotheses 
Many previous studies have focused on testing the correlation between SND spreads and 
accounting risk indicators (Gorton & Santomero 1989, Flannery & Sorescu 1996, Gropp et al., 
2006, Sironi, 2003, Covitz et al., 2004, DeYoung et al., 2001). Since no studies have been testing 
this with CoCos we will take a similar approach and regress the chosen accounting variables and 
contract specific variables on the spread of the CoCos. Since the underlying structure of the 
CoCo is similar to SNDs and other hybrids, we assume a linear relationship on all variables. 
Previous studies has however been expressing concerns about the assumption of  linearity among 
SNDs and banks risk (Gorton & Santomero, 1989), so this is also something that need to be 
tested in order to determine the best model to use. 
 
The panel regression will be constructed as follows: 
 
 
 
Where, 
COCOSPREADit  =  The difference between the CoCo yield of maturity or yield to worst and the 
yield of a similar treasury security related to the issuance currency. 
Xit  = Accounting measures of bank risks 
Yit  = Issue specific variables related to the structure of the instruments 
Zit  = Control variables affecting banks CoCo spread 
 
Panel data has the advantages of being more informative than cross sectional data or time series 
data individually that only captures either the variation across firms or years. In panel data both 
time and cross section information can be captured. By fixing the time dimension it is possible to 
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control for heterogeneity and by fixing the parameters in time across CSUs it is possible to 
control for time-specific variation. Arguably the panel data allows for an increased number of 
measurement points with more variation, and it helps to mitigate some of the collinearity 
problems otherwise present between firms or/and time (Brooks, 2008, pp. 487-494). 
 
Addressing the concern about non-linearity among variables, additional robustness tests of the 
data was performed. This test was performed following previous articles addressing this problem 
for SND. Sironi (2003) use the product of ROA and Leverage, and also use the product of loan 
loss reserves and Leverage. Jagtiani et al. (2002) scale all the risk indicators by leverage to 
control for non-linearity. Similar to these studies we will use the product of ROA, Tier 1, Core 
Tier 1 and Non-performing loans with leverage to design new variables and add to the final 
regression to evaluate if the coefficients are significant. If so, the variables are dependent on each 
other and could bias the result. We will also test for non-linearity by taking the accounting risk 
variables all squared and if some of these coefficients are significant this can be interpret as a 
convex (positive) or concave (negative) relationship indicating non-linearity. 
    
Another modification of the panel data is to use the White cross-section coefficient covariance 
method to mitigate the potential problem of correlated standard errors. The white test is a robust 
standard error modification which allow for clustering of the standard errors when there is 
correlation between firms residuals (Brooks, 2008, p.152). This could be a potential problem in 
our case since the panel data is built on each issue and some of the banks included have several 
issues within our sample. Petersen (2007) evaluate the problem of unbiased standard error within 
corporate finance and asset pricing articles, and conclude that several articles published have had 
this problem and ignores the correlation between residuals leading to a false result. To mitigate 
this problem either White or Fama-MacBeth models is argued as appropriate methods to use.  
 
4.6 Limitations of data 
The proposed method and data could have some limitations, such as lack of measure points. 
Analyzing instruments as new as CoCos has the disadvantage of limitation of data availability. 
This could be argued to be an insufficient sample to be able to draw general conclusions from 
about the features of CoCos. However the sample contains the entire available issued instruments 
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up to this date, but we are aware of that a larger sample could give more accurate results. Some 
of the measurement points in the other explanatory variables were also missing, leading to an 
unbalanced panel data set. Further, Lloyds is responsible for all issues in 2009, therefore they 
make up a substantial part of the total sample. This could potentially bias the result from our 
study, but by using different econometric methods we try to mitigate this source of bias (see 
section 5.3). Arguably this type of study has never been performed in academia before, but it 
could give an important early indication of the relationship of these variables, but certainty of the 
result can be restrained by the sample size.   
 
 
4.7 Replicability, Reliability and Validity 
Classical literature in research methodology such as Bryman and Bell (2011, pp. 157-167) argue 
for the concept of replicability, reliability and validity in quantitative research. Following the 
method chapter in this paper we believe our study is possible to replicate and through the same 
process get the same result. Further, the measurements are reliable since we provide a transparent 
view of the choices made throughout the process and we use previous articles using a similar 
approach on other subordinated debt, and hence arguably the empirical investigation measures 
the concept with consistency.  Moreover, considering the data sources and the reliability of, and 
accuracy of these measures, we believe that the quality is high since the software that are used 
are distributed by respectable firms in the financial industry. One potential source of error in our 
methodology can be derived from the manual process of collecting issue specific data from 
prospectuses. Judgments had to be made about the information content and what to include in 
our data, and what should be incorporated in our Excel spreadsheets as basis for the regressions.    
A majority of articles and research papers used throughout this paper are collected using 
LUBSearch, a search engine at the Library of Lund University. Another important step to find 
more quality references involved going through reference lists of publications by International 
Monetary Fund (IMF) and Bank of International Settlements (BIS) covering this particular topic, 
but also searching for frequently cited authors in research covering Contingent Convertibles.     
Additionally, searches through search engines was made to gather non-published (or to be 
published) working papers. Social Science Research Network (SSRN) is one source that 
frequently gave access to existing up to date research. A consequence of the nature of the topic 
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and relatively short time frame of the existence of these financial instruments is that a large part 
of the papers available are working papers.   
     
4.8 Endogeneity 
Brooks (2008) and Angrist and Pischke (2008) argue for endogeneity problems in financial 
research and present four common biases, Omitted variable bias, Simultainity, Measurement 
error and Selection bias. Considering these, the omitted variable bias seems most appropriate to 
address in our empirical investigation since a predetermined number of variables is used in the 
panel data with a possibility to leave out important explanatory variables. Since more important 
variables in the regression could be left out due to their lack of quantifiability (such as 
managerial quality), the result is only able to partly reflect the factors influencing the spread 
movement of CoCos.  This is arguable the most important limitation since the paper is expected 
to provide additional knowledge about the explanatory variables behind the spread change of 
CoCos. However, since we are using fixed effects in the time dimension these problems will be 
mitigated as much as possible. It is always possible to add variables to increase the explanatory 
power, however after reviewing previsions literature the variables included correspond to the 
most widely used and with most explanatory power when it comes to measuring risk among 
banks. 
 
Other biases such as concerns if the concept really is measured and a reverse causality problem 
seems less appropriate to address, since the concept of market discipline is a well researched 
field and our method follows previous studies. Selection bias and the self selection problem 
however could be a source of concern, since the banks in our sample decide themselves to be 
included in the sample after deciding to issue CoCos. Arguably these banks could be a false 
representation of banks in general and which could lead to a biased result. Since the sample of 
banks used in our empirical study can be argued to not correspond to the actual populations of all 
banks, a Heckman mills ratio can be introduced (as in Covitz et al., 2003) to the regression to 
mitigate potential selection bias. This fact is something that we have had in mind during the 
process, but it will however not be used in our model due to the time extensive process of 
collecting the data for all banks (to be able to use the Heckman mills ratio). The mills ratio adds 
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one explanatory variable into the original regression that corresponds to “all banks” and 
evaluates if the result holds for the entire population and not only for the firms in the sample.  
The measurement error in the variables is expected to be limited since the variables are gathered 
from software widely use in financial research and should be accurate.   
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5. Results  
 In this chapter the result from the empirical study will be presented. Following the developed 
hypotheses this chapter is divided into three sections. The first sections will present descriptive 
statistics for all variables, followed by pooled regression on the variable groups separately. 
Lastly, the constructed model with modifications will be presented and potential problems tested. 
5.1 Descriptive statistics 
5.1.1 Accounting risk variables 
 
Table 5.1 Descriptive statistics on accounting risk variables 
 COCO SPREAD ROA LEV NON PERF LOANS TIER1 CTIER1 
 Mean 5.4 0.25 18.75 3.42 12.81 11.1 
 Maximum 17.33 13.9 45.88 46.28 40.2 29.3 
 Minimum -0.29 -18.97 1.94 0.04 7.19 -1.9 
 Observations 854 1827 1902 1571 1772 1215 
All values are quarterly values, measured in percentages  
 
Descriptive statistics for the accounting risk indicators used as explanatory variables in the 
regression of the CoCo spread can be found in table 5.1. The statistics gives a good picture over 
the number of observations and distribution of the used variables. Considering the difference 
among the number of observations, the spread has approximately half of the observations 
compared to the independent variables. This is expected since the data availability for the market 
price of issued CoCos is limited, a large number of issues in 2012 and 2013 restrict potential 
observation points (see chapter four for a more detailed discussion). The range between 
maximum and minimum in our data could be suspicious at first sight, but since the sample 
include banks with problems during the financial turmoil in Europe these numbers correspond to 
actual observations. The mean values give a better representation of a majority of the banks. All 
variables are measured in percentages. 
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Table 5.2 Correlation matrix on accounting risk variables 
 COCO SPREAD ROA LEV NON PERF LOANS TIER1 CTIER1 
COCO SPREAD 1.00       
ROA 0.03 1.00     
LEV 0.02 -0.16 1.00    
NON PERF LOANS 0.56 -0.18 -0.04 1.00     
TIER1 -0.24 0.16 -0.02 -0.47 1.00   
CTIER1 -0.39 0.15 -0.09 -0.57 0.90 1.00 
 
Table 5.2 provides a correlation matrix of the accounting risk indicators. As presented in the 
previous chapter, the Tier 1 and Core Tier 1 measure are closely linked and should therefore 
have a high correlation. Consequently, this is reflected in the matrix with a correlation of 0.9 
between the two measures. The Tier 1 ratio has a large number of measurement points, and will 
hence be used in the regression instead of Core Tier 1. Further, the correlation among the other 
variables does not indicate a possible multicollinearity problem since the second highest is 
between non-performing loans and the CoCo spread with a value of 0.57. For the full correlation 
matrix on all variables see appendix 4. 
 
 
5.1.2 Issue specific and control variables 
 
Table 5.3 Descriptive statistics on CoCo features dummy and control variables 
 Mean Maximum Minimum Observations 
CALLABLE Y/N 0.55 1 0 2247 
COUPON FREQ 0.32 1 0 2184 
COUPON TYPE 0.68 1 0 2247 
LOSS ABSORPTION 0.47 1 0 1869 
PERPETUAL Y/N 0.29 1 0 2289 
REGT AT1ORT2 0.31 1 0 1848 
TRIGGER LEVEL 0.75 1 0 1596 
LN ISSUE SIZE 6.25 8.01 1.91 2289 
LN RETURN 0.03 2.57 -2.71 1906 
LN TA 13.1 14.52 7.16 1897 
All CoCo features are constructed as dummy variables. Control variables denoted as natural logarithmic 
terms.  
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Table 5.3 present descriptive statistics of issue specific features and control variables, the actual 
values are less interesting since all features are constructed as dummy variables. However, the 
number of observations are given, resulting in approximately 2000 observations for each 
variable, except lower for the trigger level variable, this is primarily due to inconclusive 
information or lack of explicit information in issuer's prospectus. The control variables issue 
size, stock return and total assets are adjusted with the natural logarithm to get a comparable 
measurement. 
 
5.2 Pooled regressions 
Before adding any modifications and corrections to the regression, we present the regression 
separately in order to provide a better visualization of the effect of any changes to the original 
specification. 
 
Table 5.4 Pooled regression on accounting risk variables 
 
 
 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob. 
     
     
ROA 0.512988 0.147005 3.489592 0.0005*** 
LEV 0.079088 0.033299 2.375108 0.0180** 
NON PERF LOANS 0.687122 0.048841 14.06863 0.0000*** 
TIER1 -0.009019 0.054194 -0.166428 0.8679 
C 1.260305 1.014512 1.242277 0.2148 
     
R-squared 0.350052    
The table reports the output from the OLS regression. *Denotes significance at the 10% level, ** 5% and 
*** 1%. 
  
Table 5.4 represent a pooled regression using the calculated CoCo spread as dependent variable 
and our accounting risk variables as independent variables. Given the result, all variables except 
Tier 1 are significant within a 95% confidence interval. These variables together explain 35% of 
the variation in the CoCo spread, according to the R-squared measure. Further, since the data in 
the sample is unbalanced some of the issued CoCos will automatically be excluded in the 
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regression, leaving us with 80 cross sections and 453 observations using only the accounting risk 
variables as independent variables.  
 
 
Table 5.5 Pooled regression on CoCo features dummy variables 
 
 
 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob. 
     
     
TRIGGER LEVEL 0.113884 0.359371 0.316900 0.7514 
CALLABLE Y/N 0.477761 0.255472 1.870112 0.0619* 
COUPON FREQ 0.232110 0.181971 1.275534 0.2026 
COUPON TYPE 1.583002 0.367922 4.302553 0.0000*** 
LOSS ABSORPTION 2.135887 0.362063 5.899217 0.0000*** 
PERPETUAL Y/N 0.736174 0.429001 1.716020 0.0866* 
REGT AT1ORT2 -0.061585 0.427701 -0.143992 0.8856 
C 2.300436 0.519978 4.424099 0.0000*** 
     
     
R-squared 0.166345 
 
   
The table reports the output from the OLS regression. *Denotes significance at the 10% level, ** 5% and 
*** 1%. 
 
All CoCo features included as explanatory variables are also regressed separately on the 
dependent variable in order to give a better interpretation of the relationship. As presented above 
the output from the regression indicates that the two variables, loss absorption and coupon type 
have a significant relationship to the spread of the issued CoCos, at 5% significance level. The 
explanatory power using R-square as a measure indicates that approximately 16% of the 
variation in the spread of CoCos is related to issue specific features captured in these variables. 
This is less than half of the explanatory power of the accounting risk variables presented 
previously. The regression includes spreads of 64 issued CoCos and 649 observations.  
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Table 5.6 Pooled regression on control variables 
 
 
 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob. 
     
     
LN ISSUE SIZE -0.619985 0.070945 -8.738918 0.0000*** 
LN RETURN -4.109809 0.384407 -10.69131 0.0000*** 
LN TA 1.353394 0.158348 8.546951 0.0000*** 
C -9.127178 2.268939 -4.022662 0.0001*** 
     
     
R-squared 0.313124    
The table reports the output from the OLS regression. *Denotes significance at the 10% level, ** 5% and 
*** 1%. 
 
The control variables by themselves regressed on the spread of the CoCos, all have significant 
coefficients. The change in return of the underlying stock, the size of the issue and size of the 
firm measured in total assets all seems to have a important role explaining variations in the CoCo 
spread. The R-squared in this regression is around 30% which is close to the explanatory power 
of the accounting risk measures. Note that the public or private dummy is excluded in the 
regression due to a warning for near singular matrix using Eviews. At first glance this could be 
due to a close correlation to the loss absorption dummy since most banks that are private 
consequently issue write-down CoCos. However, this was found not to be the case, so we 
decided to exclude this variable to not risk having a source of error in the final model.   
 
5.3 Model and modifications 
Since the structure of the panel data is exposed to potential econometric problems a range of tests 
are performed in order to evaluate the best possible model to empirically investigate evidence of 
market discipline. In table 5.7 a summary of the regressions are presented and further discussed 
in the text on the following page. 
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Table 5.7 Model results 
 
    
 1 2 3 
Intercept -18.86***  (4.52) -18.86 ** (8.24)  10.33*** (1.31) 
ROA 0.43*** (0.15) 0.43 (0.36) -0.12 (0.08) 
TIER1 0.31*** (0.07) 0.31*** (0.09) -0.07** (0.03) 
NON PERF LOANS 0.53*** (0.08) 0.53*** (0.14) 0.14*** (0.05) 
LEV -0.11* (0.06) -0.11 (0.11) 0.04* (0.02) 
CALLABLE Y/N 0.43 (0.42) 0.43* (0.23) 0.19 (0.17) 
COUPON FREQ -0.55** (0.24) -0.55*** (0.13 ) -0.56*** (0.10) 
COUPON TYPE 1.04 (0.65) 1.04*** (0.36) 1.29*** (0.38) 
LOSS ABSORPTION 0.68 (0.54) 0.68 (0.45) 0.12 (0.19) 
PERPETUAL Y/ N 0.46 (0.60) 0.46 (0.51) 1.39*** (0.26) 
REGT AT1ORT2  1.05 (0.59) 1.05** (0.42) 0.94*** (0. 18) 
TRIGGER LEVEL -0.56 (0.50) -0.56 (0.46) -0.74*** (0.19) 
LN ISSUE SIZE -0.54*** (0.10) -0.54*** (0.07) -0.48*** (0.06) 
LN RETURN -3.56*** (0.47) -3.56 (2.39) 0.27 (0.22) 
LN TA 1.66*** (0.35) 1.66** (0.67) -0.16 (0.10) 
     
White standard error correction  No Yes Yes 
Period fixed effects No No Yes 
    
    
R-Squared 0.49 0.49 0.93 
# Observations 351 351 351 
    
(*Denotes significance at the 10% level, ** 5% and *** 1%. The value in brackets 
represent the standard errors in each coefficient) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
D. Iseklint & D. Bengtsson 
67 
Firstly, all variables will be included in a regular pooled regression without additional effects. In 
table 5.7 the relationship between the variables differ both for the coefficients and the 
significance level of the included explanatory variables, compared to regressing these separately. 
The output present a range of variables that now are significant at 5%-level. All the control 
variables and ROA, Non-performing loans, Tier 1 and coupon frequency accordingly have an 
important role in explaining changes in the CoCo spread. The variable capturing the loss 
absorption mechanism is no longer significant when included in the final regression, unlike the 
regression with only issue specific features. This is an unexpected outcome considering its 
importance in the contract structure. The R-square has now increased to 49% and the number of 
issues include decreased to 55, but still with 351 observations included in the regression. 
Since several issuers have issued more than one instrument and the panel data is constructed 
using ISIN codes as CSU and not the individual firm, a White cross-section standard error 
correction is necessary in order to create more accurate standard errors and mitigate a possible 
heteroscedasticity problem. Without introducing this modification we assume that the firms are 
independent of each other, and using the issue specific ISIN codes were the issuing bank is used 
multiple times makes that assumption false. In regression 2, Table 5.7, the output is presented 
when White cross-section is used to correct the standard errors. As expected the significance 
level of the variables changes quite drastically, arguably emphasizing the importance of this 
correction. Both ROA and the control variable LN (Return) falls out of being significant at 5% 
level. However, the issue specific features, regulatory treatment and coupon type is significant at 
the same level. The only value corrected is the standard error and therefore all coefficients 
remain the same as in the previous regression. 
Lastly, since the time-frame involves a period of turbulent financial markets, the period effect of 
the data could be substantial. Arguably a fixed effect on cross sections could also be appropriate, 
but considering the size of the sample with more expected variation between firms then to time, 
the period fixed effect seems more appropriate to use compared with cross-section fixed effects. 
The period fixed effect will also address the potential problem of not incorporating variables that 
capture changes in the macroeconomic variables, that could bias the result through a global 
increase in risk and a change in the underlying banks. Given the results in regression 3, table 5.7 
using both white cross section and period fixed effects have a significant impact on the 
regression coefficients and the standard errors. By introduction dummy variables for each 
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quarter, LN (TA) becomes insignificant but perpetual and trigger level becomes significant 
compared to the previous regression. The R-squared reaches 92% compared to the previous 48%, 
indicating that half of the variation in the spread is not covered by our explanatory variables. 
This also highlights the fact that unobserved variables in time have a significant effect explaining 
the variation of the CoCo spread. Importantly since these unobserved effects are not captured by 
the included explanatory variables, the period fixed effect neutralizes this problem and gives a 
more correct interpretation. 
 
Table 5.8 Economic interpretation of the significant variables 
 NON 
PERF 
LOANS 
TIER1 COUPON 
FREQ 
COUPON 
TYPE 
PERPETU
AL Y/N 
REGT 
AT1ORT2 
TRIGGER 
LEVEL 
LN  
ISSUE 
SIZE 
Change in 
spread 
0.49 -0.25 -0.56 
 
1.29 
 
1.39 
 
0.94 
 
-0.74 
 
-0.59 
 
P-value 0.0018*** 0.0421** 0*** 0.0007*** 0*** 0*** 0.0001*** 0*** 
*Denotes significance at the 10% level, ** 5% and *** 1%. 
 
The economic interpretation of the coefficients will be better understood by looking at the effect 
on the spread by a one standard deviation change in the explanatory variable. Since the 
significant variables are most interesting, the table above presents these variables with standard 
deviation times the coefficient in the final regression. However, since the dummy variables only 
take the value 1 or 0 these will correspond to the actual coefficient and not the change after a 
change in standard deviation. The result provides numbers indicating that CoCo specific features 
have a significant impact on the spread of CoCos. The value range from -0.74 to 1.39 which 
means that a change of one standard deviation in the underlying variable corresponds to -0.74% 
to 1.39% change in the spread. However, since most of the significant variables are dummy 
variables this interpretation of one standard deviation change is only applied for the change in 
the accounting risk measures, non-performing loans and Tier 1. Comparing these two, a one 
standard deviation increase in non-performing loans will give an increase of 0.49% on the CoCo 
spread and for the Tier 1 ratio this will lead to a decrease of 0.25% in the spread. This is almost 
half the change compared to the previous indicating that non-performing loans is important to 
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determine the spread of this instrument. One standard deviation change in issue size results in a -
0.59% change in the spread. 
 
5.4 Robustness tests 
To evaluate the necessity of using period fixed effects in the panel data, a redundant fixed effect 
test is performed. The result is presented in appendix 11, and indicates at a 1% significant level 
that the null hypothesis of no period fixed effect can be strongly rejected. Period effects are 
therefore significantly proven to be present in our sample leading to the use of period fixed effect 
to develop a more accurate model specification. 
Since previous articles has expressed concern of non-linearity between accounting risk measures 
and the spread (market based measure), we perform a test of linearity with the explanatory 
variables all to the power of two also included in the final regression to find possible evidence of 
nonlinearity. All variables have insignificant coefficients except Return on assets (ROA), this 
could be interpreted as ROA and the CoCo spread having a concave (negative) correlation which 
gives some bias to this coefficient in the final regression (see appendix 8).   
Previous studies (Sironi, 2003 & Jagtiani et al. 2002) suggest another method to test for non-
linearity by the use of the product of two variables and include these in the final regression to see 
if they are significant. Taking this approach only the Tier 1 ratio times leverage gives a 
significant coefficient (see appendix 9). The coefficient is negative could be argued that these 
two variables have a negative relationship that could distort the result to some extent. This will 
not have any major change in the interpretation of the final result but is important to have in 
mind since these identified potential errors could have some influence.    
 
Testing for the normality of the distribution is done with a Jarque Bera test to see if the residuals 
are normally distributed, which is an assumption in this t-test. The null hypothesis of normal 
distribution is rejected which lead to lack of robustness in the residuals. The skewness is 0.35 
and the kurtosis is 3.67, compared to the normal distribution with a skewness of 0 and kurtosis of 
3 (see appendix 10). These values are close to a normal distribution and arguably the assumption 
in the regression will not be violated to a extent in which the result becomes invalid.  
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6. Analysis  
In this chapter the result will be analyzed in relation to the theoretical framework. The analysis 
of the empirical result is divided into two sections, market discipline and CoCo specific features. 
 
6.1 Hypotheses  
Firstly, this chapter will present and analyze the empirical result in the context of our pre-
specified hypotheses. The presented hypotheses generated from theory and the literature review 
was developed to evaluate the evidence of market discipline with hypotheses 1-4 based on 
accounting risk measures, and the fifth hypothesis to incorporate the issue specific effects on the 
CoCo spread (see chapter 3, section 3.6). 
From the result of the final regression, the interpretation of the coefficients for the accounting 
risk measures is that both non-performing loans to total assets and Tier 1 ratio has a significant 
effect on the spread of issued CoCos (at 5% significance level). This result leads to a rejection of 
the H0 of both hypotheses 2 and 4. Since the other variables leverage and ROA has a higher p-
value than 0.05, H0 in hypothesis 1 and 3 are accepted indicating no significant correlation to the 
change in CoCo spread. With an increase in non-performing loans the riskiness of the bank 
should go up, which is expected to lead to an increased spread for the CoCo, which correspond 
to the positive coefficient from our regression output. Further, an increase in Tier 1 ratio is 
expected to indicate that the overall riskiness of the bank has decreased with a stronger capital 
position, leading to a decrease in the spread, captured by a negative coefficient in the regression.  
  
Looking at the fifth hypothesis related to the issue specific features of the CoCos, several of the 
dummy variables included in the final panel regression show significant effect on the CoCo 
spread. We therefore reject the H0, as at least one of the issue specific features has a significant 
correlation to the spread. Five out of total seven feature dummies are significant at a 1% 
significance level. These are variables capturing the following features; coupon frequency, 
coupon type, perpetual, regulatory treatment and trigger level. From the result the interpretation 
is that an annual coupon frequency and a trigger level ≤ 5.125% will have a negative effect on 
the spread. If the issue characteristics has one or more of the features; perpetual (has no maturity 
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date), classified as Tier 1 and has a fixed coupon type, this results in a positive effect on the 
spread, according to the output from our model. Moreover, the remaining features, callability and 
loss absorption mechanism are not significant at 5% significance level. 
 
6.2 Analysis of empirical result 
This section provides an analysis of the result from the rejection or acceptance of the hypotheses 
in relation to the concept of market discipline, and connect this to previous empirical research 
and theory. Since the purpose of this paper is to evaluate if market discipline is exerted in the 
market for CoCos, this is the focus in the analysis. However, the design of the instrument can 
play a significant role as discussed, so this will also be analyzed.  
 
6.2.1 Market discipline - evidence or not 
The results from our empirical study of CoCos show that a significant relationship between 
CoCo spreads as a market-based measure and the benchmark measure (accounting risk 
indicators) can be established. This can be interpreted as a sign that market participants 
(investors in CoCos) are sensitive to accounting proxies for bank risk, and that evidence of 
market discipline through monitoring is apparent.  
Previous research on the concept of market discipline (see, Covitz et al., 2004; Flannery & 
Soresco, 1996; Jagtiani et al., 2002; Sironi, 2003) indicates that in a business environment with 
less government guarantees, investors tend to become more interested in monitoring the 
underlying risk of the banks in which they have investments in through SND instruments. After 
the GFC in 2007-2009 the regulatory approach has been to increase the responsibility among 
investors to take the loss in distressed times and not expect government bail-outs using taxpayer 
money, arguably this should lead to more market discipline. The purpose of the introduction of 
CoCos in the Basel framework is to do just that, to reallocate some of the risk from the 
government to the investors and stakeholders in the banks. The result generated from our final 
regression points to some extent of market discipline since two out of four accounting risk 
indicators has a significant correlation to the spread. This could be interpreted as investors 
considers these two measures, non-performing loans and Tier 1 ratio as informative predictors of 
bank risk in their evaluation of a reasonable level of the spread. Furthermore, return on assets 
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and leverage shows no significant relationship to the variability of the spread, therefore no 
conclusions or answers can be drawn on the basis of those variables alone. However, our sample 
size is limited, but the non-significant variables at 5% level is almost significant at 10%, 
indicating that these are also very close to be deemed an important factor reflected in the spread 
of CoCos. The significant accounting risk variables are still significant even though the limited 
sample size, leading to an even stronger indication that these play an important part in the 
determination of the spread. Thus, arguably the evidence for market discipline is stronger 
compared to evidence for lack of market discipline when evaluating the result. 
As discussed briefly in the result chapter the economic interpretation of the accounting risk 
indicators points to what could be expected. An increase in non- performing loans is a sign of a 
weaker business environment and higher spread can be expected from investors. An increase in 
Tier 1 ratio should equal a positive sign (lower spread) from an investors perspective since the 
risk of the issuer not being able to fulfill its obligations has decreased and so also the 
approximation of the firms’ probability of breaching the trigger level (and ultimately probability 
of default). Gupta et al. (2013) use the CET1 ratio as the primary component to model the risk of 
breaching the trigger in their pricing approach. According to Gupta et al. (2013) the CET1 ratio 
includes valuable information about the banks risk profile and is also often linked to the trigger 
level. The Tier 1 ratio does not correspond exactly to the CET1 ratio as discussed, but are closely 
linked.  
 
Sironi (2003) analyze the non-linearity with an interaction term and argues for a significant 
interaction between ROA and leverage. Testing our sample no significant correlation between 
change in ROA and leverage can be found. However, the Tier 1 ratio and leverage shows a 
significant relationship when included as an interaction term in the model. Banks with higher 
Tier 1 also appear to have lower leverage. The non-linearity problem addressed by Sironi (2003) 
and Jagtiani et al. (2002) is not of the same concern when it comes to our sample. Beside the Tier 
1 ratio using an interaction term, ROA is the only variable that is significant when included as 
squared in our model. ROA has a concave (negative) relationship and not linear. However, all 
the other accounting risk variables have a linear relationship to the spread so the potential bias on 
the result is presumed to be limited.   
D. Iseklint & D. Bengtsson 
73 
Further, only the issue size is significant in our model when considering the control variables. 
Larger issues are interpreted with less risk when it comes to the spread. Further, Sironi (2003) 
and Flannery (1996) argue that LN (TA) should be significant since large banks in size measured 
in terms of total assets, would be consider being less risky from investors. This does not 
correspond to the result provided from our model since the control variable LN (TA) is not 
significant.  
Considering the explanatory power of these variables, compared to other similar studies 
examining the market discipline in markets for SNDs, these have R-squared measures in a range 
of 0.3-0.8 with an average of 0.53 (see summary in table 3.1). This can be compared to our 
explanatory power of 0.48 before using period fixed effects (see table 5.7). Since almost half of 
all the variation of the spread can be explained using our chosen variables and about one third 
using accounting risk variables alone, this leaves room for further analysis. DeYoung et al. 
(2001) discusses the CAMEL framework for providing a risk approximation of banks. Following 
this approach both the M (management) and L (liquidity) are not included as variables into our 
model and could have provided additional explanatory power. However, including proxies of 
management quality could provide problems since it is not sure that the variables measure the 
actual concept giving room for measurement error. 
The point of non-viability trigger (PONV, regulatory trigger) included in a majority of CoCos 
that comply with Basel III is a variable that is difficult to quantify, and it is an uncertainty for 
investors and holders of CoCos. This trigger could have been included as an explanatory variable 
in our study, to see a difference between issues with or without this trigger. But similarly to 
proxies of management quality, a PONV variable could also suffer from measurement error and 
how it actually affects the spread could prove hard to interpret. 
Further, Forssbӕck (2011) and Gropp et al. (2006) argue for the complementary information 
about a firm's default probability using both market and accounting risk measures. The 
unexplained variation in our model could therefore be decreased by introducing additional 
market based variables. The focus of this paper is however to find evidence of market discipline 
and therefore accounting based measures are the foundation in our model.       
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The empirical result indicates market discipline in CoCos and could be interpreted as an early 
indication, with more secured evidence to be available in the future when a larger sample size 
becomes available. Comments from market participant in financial newspapers about the most 
profound sources of the demand for CoCos indicated to be the attractive high yield in these 
instruments, this do not correspond to the result provided from this study. Investors seem to 
incorporate the accounting risk indicators non-performing loans and Tier 1 ratio into their 
investment decisions which is reflected through the spread. The initial purpose from the 
regulatory perspective in this regard can be argued to be partly fulfilled with evidence of market 
discipline. However, the potential failure or success of CoCos will be revealed through their loss 
absorption capabilities in the next period of financial turmoil or crisis. The results are 
inconclusive since not all accounting risk measures appear to have significant coefficients. 
Comparing the explanatory power of issuer characteristics by accounting risk measures to issue 
features, they stand for about 35% and 16% of the variation respectively. This can be interpreted 
as both the banks risk profile and the contract specific details accounted for in the perceived 
riskiness of these instruments by market participants.   
 
6.2.2 CoCo specific features  
Several issue specific features was significant in the final regression and hence this result needs 
to be evaluated in order to finds some theoretical explanations for this outcome. As presented 
throughout this paper the analyzed instruments has a quite unique structure and arguably 
investors could be more interested in the issue specific details, than other factors such as the 
underlying riskiness of the banks. As evaluated in the section above, investors to some extent 
seems to incorporate the riskiness of the underlying into the traded securities, however since 
many features show up with a significant coefficient as well these needs to be set into context. 
The issue specific variables alone as explanatory variables for the variability of the spread of 
CoCos appear to be relatively poor in terms of explanatory power, compared to accounting risk 
measures.    
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A statistically significant coefficient for the dummy variable coupon frequency appears in our 
final regression model. The result suggests that with an annual coupon frequency the spread 
would decrease compared to other short term payout schemes. The dummy variable for coupon 
type has a significant positive coefficient, suggesting a higher spread for CoCos with a fixed 
coupon. Investors arguably add an additional risk margin on the issues having a fixed coupon, 
this could be due to the current low interest environment since an expected increase in future 
interest rates would hurt the fixed coupon bonds. Several CoCos (approximately 20 in our 
sample) have the coupon type “floating: fixed then floating”, in our dummy variable these are 
classified as having a fixed coupon. This could potentially distort the result, but most issues with 
this feature have a fixed coupon until first allowed call date and are issued recently.   
 
CoCos with the feature perpetual (AT1 classified if issued under Basel III) increases the spread 
significantly, suggested by the coefficient in our regression. From the perspective of an investor 
a perpetual bond have more risk included since a larger time span has to be included in both the 
valuation and the probability of default analysis. If using a credit derivatives approach for pricing 
the bond for example. CoCo bonds without maturity has been proven to provide several 
problems considering the credit derivatives approach to pricing since a non-predetermined 
stream of coupon payments is hard to incorporate into the model (Wilkens & Bethke, 2014). The 
longer time to maturity of the CoCo bond also increases the probability that a trigger event might 
occur, this also suggest that investors should demand higher spreads for perpetual feature CoCos.   
 
If the issues regulatory treatment allows them to be included as Tier 1 (Additional Tier 1 under 
Basel III) then the spread is increased compared to CoCos treated as Tier 2. AT1 CoCos issued 
to comply with Basel III have cancellable coupons at the issuers’ discretion, this is arguably a 
source of uncertainty for holders of CoCo bonds. It is therefore a reasonable expected outcome, 
investors appear to demand a higher yield from CoCos with this built in uncertainty of future 
coupon streams. Moreover, AT1 CoCos have a feature that allows issuer calls after five years 
(without features that give incentives to redeem at first call) even though they are issued as 
perpetual. This fact could also partly explain the increased spread for AT1. De Spiegleer and 
Schoutens (2014) discuss how investors can integrate extension risk when valuing Tier 1 CoCos, 
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which is the risk that the bonds considered to expire at first call will not be called in. This 
extension risk (non-call risk) appears to be one explanation for the higher spread.                
  
The dummy variable that captures the issue feature trigger level is statistically significant, the 
coefficient indicates that issues with a trigger of 5.125% or lower have a negative effect on the 
spread. The pricing models covered in our literature review (see e.g., Corcuera et al., 2013; 
Glasserman & Nouri, 2012; Gupta et al. 2013) all try to estimate the probability of breaching a 
pre-specified trigger using different approaches. The additional risk specific to CoCos compared 
to other subordinated bonds comes primarily from the loss absorption mechanism activated when 
the trigger level is breached. With a lower trigger comes a decreased probability of reaching the 
trigger all else equal. As expected, investors in CoCos arguably appear to incorporate the trigger 
level in their assessment of the appropriate level of spread demanded.    
 
The two dummies capturing the issue features callable or not, and loss absorption mechanism 
(write-down or equity conversion) proved to be not statistically significant in our final 
regression. This is an unexpected outcome, but which presumably could be a result of our limited 
sample size and observation points. From the theory and literature we expected that these two 
features would be playing an important role in explaining the variability of the spread. The 
difference in loss absorption should arguably be an important factor as it determines what loss or 
conversion the CoCo investors are exposed to and how the issuers (and its shareholders) are 
affected at conversion. In the same way the issuers ability to call-in (redeem) the instrument (as 
discussed above) pre-maturely should be a risk factor of significance for the market’s perception 
of CoCos risk and therefore the spreads of the instruments. However, as the coefficients of these 
variables are not significant we have no secure evidence for arguments either against or for these 
factors importance. The literature review covering incentive problems where primarily aimed at 
being related to a discussion of differences in the loss absorption mechanism. As the variable 
capturing if the issues have an equity conversion or principal write-down is not significant, we 
leave this analysis to further research. 
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7. Conclusion 
 This concluding chapter will give some final thoughts given the outcome from the empirical 
result and analysis. Lastly, we discuss suggestions for further research in the field of contingent 
convertibles. 
 
7.1 Implications  
To conclude, the result from our study points towards evidence for market discipline in the 
market for contingent convertible capital. The result from this paper provides an indicative sign 
of movement in the right direction from a regulatory perspective. The essential target when this 
automatically loss absorbing instrument was introduced, was to enhance the responsibility of 
investors to take their part in a potential negative scenario and not leave the bill to the state. With 
regard to our result, this goal seems to be possible to fulfill, since investors in CoCos are 
sensitive to changes in bank risk indicators and these changes in risk are reflected in the spread 
of CoCos. Investors appear to monitor risk associated with the issuing bank when their 
investments are not backed by government guarantees, and incorporates this assessment of risk 
into the spreads of these securities. Furthermore, our result indicates that contract specific 
features of the CoCos in our sample have a complementary explanatory power, but investors 
appear to factor in issuer characteristics to a larger extent when observing and pricing risk.  
As identified in the first part of the paper, a common discussion among market participants is the 
driving factors for the demand from investors in CoCos. An argument put forward is that 
investors acting in the current low interest rate environment are prone to invest in CoCos due to 
the high yield, and not fully incorporating all risk inherent in the product. This argumentation 
does not correspond to the interpretation of our result. Our findings suggest that investors in 
CoCos to some extent includes both issuer and issue characteristics in their investment decisions, 
so yield cannot be the only determining factor.   
 
 
 
 
D. Iseklint & D. Bengtsson 
78 
7.2 Generalizability  
Due to the sample size, relatively short time frame and potential for improvements in the 
econometric model it is hard to generalize the result with complete certainty. The banks included 
in our sample are included since they have issued contingent convertible bonds and might not be 
completely representative for banks in general. However, to our knowledge the sample includes 
all issued CoCos since 2009, and a diverse group of issuing banks in terms of geographic 
location, size and business profile. This strengthens our result and increases the possibility to 
generalize the findings to a broader set of banks issuing CoCos. Since no instruments are issued 
by US banks our findings might not applicable for the US banking industry.            
The lack of standardization of the contracts (which sets the issue specific features), the still early 
stage of market development, and existence of several pricing approaches in academia all leaves 
room for inconsistency in pricing. This factor could influence the spread and potentially 
aggravate the generalizability of the result. 
 
7.3 Practitioners  
The result from this paper can be important for three target groups, regulators, investors and 
issuing banks. From the regulators view, we contribute with new empirical evidence of market 
discipline through CoCos. Our results supports the initial purpose of CoCo bonds, the 
instruments forced loss absorbing function appear to make investors sensitive to bank risks and 
through this imposes market discipline. From the investors perspective the implication from our 
result highlights key issuer characteristics and issue features that plays a significant role in 
explaining the variability of the spread. It also emphasizes that our model only incorporates some 
variables which leaves room for evaluating other variables and closely examine contracts details 
when comparing spreads on different issues. For the issuing banks of CoCo bonds our result 
provide incentives for banks to have financial soundness since investors appear to reward this 
behavior with lower spreads in issued CoCos. However to make the instrument attractive for 
investors the details in the contracts need to be clear since our results provide indications that 
apart from the riskiness in the banks, the riskiness of the contract will be essential to determine 
the spread.  
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7.4 Proposal for further research 
The young market of CoCos limits our study in terms of data availability, and for further 
research in this field a larger sample size could give a more accurate result and greater 
generalizability from the evaluation of market discipline. Further, since our study includes 
variables well researched in other subordinated debt, an increased number of variables could be 
included to try to explain more of the movement of the spread. It would also be interesting to 
investigate the behavior of CoCos in times of distress, and see if the concept of market discipline 
applies or if the instruments fail to provide the necessary loss absorption. In the same way 
incentive problems and the changes in capital structure will be interesting to assess in times of 
financial turmoil. Lastly, the rating aspect of CoCos could be given more attention as the market 
develops, a suggestion would be to use ratings assigned as one explanatory variable and its 
explanatory power of the spread of CoCos compared to studies with other subordinated debt 
issues.    
Since the market only has been active since 2009 and with increased attention in the last year, 
CoCos have a large potential when it comes to empirical research going forward. Further 
research should continue to evaluate this instrument to be able to give it a proper design in order 
to work as firstly intended and mitigate the civil cost of future financial crises. 
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9. Appendix 
 
Appendix 1 - List of all firms with issued CoCos data  
Issuer  Issuer 
domicile 
Coupon Maturity Issue date ISIN Currency Amount Outstanding Amount Outstanding in USD S&P Rating Issue year 
Bendigo and Adelaide Bank AU 5.427 29/01/2024 2014-01-29 AU3FN0021952 AUD 263.0 235.3 BBB 2014 
Credit Agricole FR 7.875 N/A 2014-01-23 USF22797RT78 USD 1750.0 1750.0 BB+ 2014 
Credit Agricole FR 7.875 N/A 2014-01-23 US225313AD75 USD 1750.0 1750.0 BB+ 2014 
Ostjydsk Bank (EXCLUDED) DK 9.765 N/A 2014-01-01 DK0030323456 DKK 8.8 1.6 N/A 2014 
Den Jyske Sparekasse (EXCLUDED) DK 11.457 N/A 2014-01-01 DK0030298088 DKK 8.9 1.7 N/A 2014 
Spar Nord Bank (EXCLUDED) DK 9.69 N/A 2014-01-01 DK0030178421 DKK 238.7 44.0 N/A 2014 
Press Kogyo  (EXCLUDED) N/A 0 28/12/2018 2013-12-30 XS0976017474 JPY 95.2 1.5 N/A 2013 
Banco Santander MX 5.95 30/01/2024 2013-12-27 US05969BAB99 USD 1300.0 1300.0 BB 2013 
Banco Santander MX 5.95 30/01/2024 2013-12-19 USP1507SAD91 USD 1300.0 1300.0 BB 2013 
Societe Generale FR 7.875 N/A 2013-12-18 US83367TBF57 USD 1750.0 1750.0 BB+ 2013 
Societe Generale FR 7.875 N/A 2013-12-18 USF8586CRW49 USD 1750.0 1750.0 BB+ 2013 
Credit Suisse CH 7.5 N/A 2013-12-11 US22546DAB29 USD 2250.0 2250.0 BB- 2013 
Barclays GB 8 N/A 2013-12-10 XS1002801758 EUR 1377.0 1897.4 B+ 2013 
Danske Bank DK 4.75 05/06/2024 2013-11-26 XS0999631665 SEK 138.7 21.5 BBB- 2013 
Barclays GB 8.25 N/A 2013-11-20 US06738EAA38 USD 2000.0 2000.0 B+ 2013 
Credit Suisse CH 7.5 N/A 2013-11-12 XS0989394589 USD 2250.0 2250.0 BB- 2013 
United Overseas Bank SG 4.75 N/A 2013-11-11 SG58I7998534 SGD 402.0 318.2 BBB- 2013 
DBS Group SG 4.7 N/A 2013-11-04 SG59H0999851 SGD 642.3 508.5 N/A 2013 
China CITIC Bank HK 6 07/05/2024 2013-10-31 XS0985263150 USD 300.0 300.0 N/A 2013 
Home Credit & Finance Bank LU 10.5 19/04/2021 2013-10-17 US29843LAC72 USD 200.0 200.0 N/A 2013 
Russian Agricultural Bank LU 8.5 16/10/2023 2013-10-16 XS0979891925 USD 500.0 500.0 N/A 2013 
Home Credit & Finance Bank LU 10.5 19/04/2021 2013-10-10 XS0981028177 USD 200.0 200.0 N/A 2013 
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Banco Popular Espanol ES 11.5 N/A 2013-10-10 XS0979444402 EUR 676.1 931.7 N/A 2013 
Bank of India IN 9.8 30/09/2023 2013-09-30 INE084A08045 INR 79.8 1.3 N/A 2013 
Gazprombank IE 7.496 28/12/2023 2013-09-24 XS0975320879 USD 750.0 750.0 N/A 2013 
Credit Agricole FR 8.125 19/09/2033 2013-09-19 USF22797QT87 USD 1000.0 1000.0 BBB- 2013 
Credit Agricole FR 8.125 19/09/2033 2013-09-19 US225313AC92 USD 1000.0 1000.0 BBB- 2013 
Credit Suisse CH 5.75 18/09/2025 2013-09-18 XS0972523947 EUR 1669.8 2300.8 BBB- 2013 
Hellenic Bank N/A 11 N/A 2013-09-15 CY0144170111 EUR 171.9 236.8 N/A 2013 
Hellenic Bank N/A 10 N/A 2013-09-15 CY0144180110 EUR 174.2 240.0 N/A 2013 
Banco Bilbao Vizcaya Argentaria ES 9 N/A 2013-09-05 XS0926832907 USD 1500.0 1500.0 N/A 2013 
Credit Suisse CH 6 N/A 2013-09-04 CH0221803791 CHF 309.9 348.4 N/A 2013 
Credit Suisse CH 6.5 08/08/2023 2013-08-08 XS0957135212 USD 2500.0 2500.0 BBB- 2013 
Credit Suisse CH 6.5 08/08/2023 2013-08-08 US22546DAA46 USD 2500.0 2500.0 BBB- 2013 
United Overseas Bank SG 4.9 N/A 2013-07-23 SG57A1994579 SGD 672.5 532.4 BBB- 2013 
Russian Agricultural Bank LU 8.5 16/10/2023 2013-07-10 US74973DAJ81 USD 500.0 500.0 N/A 2013 
Societe Generale FR 8.25 N/A 2013-06-09 XS0867614595 USD 1250.0 1250.0 BB+ 2013 
UBS CH 4.75 22/05/2023 2013-05-22 CH0214139930 USD 1500.0 1500.0 BBB- 2013 
Sberbank LU 5.25 23/05/2023 2013-05-16 XS0935311240 USD 1000.0 1000.0 N/A 2013 
Suncorp AU 5.435 22/11/2023 2013-04-23 AU0000SUNPD
6 
AUD 746.8 668.1 BBB+ 2013 
Barclays GB 7.75 10/04/2023 2013-04-10 US06739FHK03 USD 1000.0 1000.0 BB+ 2013 
Swiss Re (EXCLUDED) IE 6.375 01/09/2024 2013-03-12 XS0901578681 USD 750.0 750.0 N/A 2013 
Industrial & Commercial Bank of China 
Asia 
HK 4.5 10/10/2023 2013-02-10 XS0976879279 USD 500.0 500.0 N/A 2013 
Banco do Brasil KY 6.25 N/A 2013-01-31 US05958AAK43 USD 2000.0 2000.0 BB 2013 
KBC BE 8 25/01/2023 2013-01-25 BE6248510610 USD 1000.0 1000.0 BB+ 2013 
Banco do Brasil KY 6.25 N/A 2013-01-13 USG07402DP58 USD 2000.0 2000.0 BB 2013 
Hoist Kredit SE 12 27/09/2023 2013-01-10 SE0005280591 SEK 51.9 8.1 N/A 2013 
Glarner Kantonalbank CH 3.5 N/A 2012-12-19 CH0201215511 CHF 76.7 86.3 N/A 2012 
Barclays GB 7.625 21/11/2022 2012-11-21 US06740L8C27 USD 3000.0 3000.0 BB+ 2012 
Julius Baer CH 5.375 N/A 2012-09-18 CH0194437668 CHF 269.0 302.5 N/A 2012 
UBS US 7.625 17/08/2022 2012-08-17 US90261AAB89 USD 2000.0 2000.0 BBB- 2012 
VTB Bank IE 9.5 N/A 2012-08-06 US91834KAA43 USD 2250.0 2250.0 N/A 2012 
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Credit Suisse GG 9.5 N/A 2012-07-31 XS0810846617 USD 1725.0 1725.0 N/A 2012 
Banco Popular Espanol N/A 4.5 29/03/2014 2012-06-29 XS0799651038 EUR 216.7 298.6 N/A 2012 
Banco BPI N/A 8.75 N/A 2012-06-26 PTBBRCOM003
7 
EUR 1265.1 1743.3 N/A 2012 
VTB Bank IE 9.5 N/A 2012-06-08 XS0810596832 USD 2250.0 2250.0 N/A 2012 
Swiss Re (EXCLUDED) IE 8.25 N/A 2012-03-29 XS0765564827 USD 750.0 750.0 N/A 2012 
Macquarie AU 10.25 20/06/2057 2012-03-26 XS0763122909 USD 250.0 250.0 N/A 2012 
Credit Suisse GG 7.125 22/03/2022 2012-03-22 CH0181115681 CHF 820.0 922.0 N/A 2012 
Banco Popular Espanol N/A 6.75 04/04/2018 2012-03-13 ES0213790035 EUR 1160.9 1599.7 N/A 2012 
Credit Europe Bank NL 10 28/02/2022 2012-02-28 XS0764697842 USD 50.0 50.0 N/A 2012 
Banco do Brasil KY 9.25 N/A 2012-02-27 US05958AAG31 USD 1750.0 1750.0 BB 2012 
UBS JE 7.25 22/02/2022 2012-02-22 XS0747231362 USD 2000.0 2000.0 BBB- 2012 
Swiss Re (EXCLUDED) CH 7.25 N/A 2012-02-09 CH0142132049 CHF 351.4 395.1 N/A 2012 
Zuercher CH 3.5 N/A 2012-01-31 CH0143808332 CHF 640.5 720.1 N/A 2012 
Banco do Brasil KY 9.25 N/A 2012-01-20 USP3772WAC66 USD 1750.0 1750.0 BB 2012 
Nomura JP 2.24 24/12/2021 2011-12-26 JP376260ABC4 JPY 1980.2 32.0 N/A 2011 
Nomura Holdings JP 2.24 24/12/2021 2011-12-26 JP376260BBC2 JPY 201.5 3.3 N/A 2011 
Rabobank NL 8.4 N/A 2011-11-09 XS0703303262 USD 2000.0 2000.0 N/A 2011 
Industrial & Commercial Bank of China 
Asia 
HK 6 04/11/2021 2011-10-28 HK0000091832 CNY 236.5 39.1 N/A 2011 
BankNordik VWAP 10.383 N/A 2011-10-24 DK0030278643 DKK 34.2 6.3 N/A 2011 
Permanent TSB N/A 10 28/07/2016 2011-10-19 IE00B712BB11 EUR 490.5 675.8 N/A 2011 
Bank of Cyprus N/A 6 N/A 2011-10-06 CY0141900114 USD 39.7 39.7 N/A 2011 
Bank of Ireland IE 10 30/07/2016 2011-07-29 XS0862044798 EUR 1333.5 1837.5 N/A 2011 
Allied Irish Banks IE 10 28/07/2016 2011-07-27 IE00B51GP956 EUR 2298.1 3166.6 N/A 2011 
Credit Suisse GG 7.875 24/02/2041 2011-02-24 XS0595225318 USD 2000.0 2000.0 BBB+ 2011 
Rabobank NL 8.375 N/A 2011-01-26 XS0583302996 USD 2000.0 2000.0 N/A 2011 
Intesa IT 9.5 N/A 2010-10-01 XS0545782020 EUR 657.1 905.4 BB 2010 
UniCredit IT 9.375 N/A 2010-07-21 XS0527624059 EUR 434.8 599.1 BB 2010 
Lloyds Bank GB 7.875 19/03/2020 2010-03-19 XS0496068429 USD 407.6 407.6 BBB- 2010 
Rabobank NL 6.875 19/03/2020 2010-03-19 XS0496281618 EUR 1692.9 2332.7 N/A 2010 
Sparekassen Sjaelland (EXCLUDED) N/A 9.311 N/A 2010-01-11 DK0030265905 DKK 7.5 1.4 N/A 2010 
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Yorkshire Building Society (EXCLUDED) GB 13.5 01/04/2025 2010-01-04 XS0498549194 GBP 39.1 64.8 N/A 2010 
Lloyds Bank GB 8.5 N/A 2009-12-17 XS0471770817 USD 276.7 276.7 BB 2009 
Lloyds Bank GB 8.5 N/A 2009-12-17 XS0473103348 USD 276.7 276.7 BB 2009 
Lloyds Bank GB 8 N/A 2009-12-15 XS0471767276 USD 1258.6 1258.6 BB 2009 
Lloyds Bank GB 8 N/A 2009-12-15 XS0473106283 USD 1258.6 1258.6 BB 2009 
Lloyds Bank GB 7.875 01/11/2020 2009-12-10 XS0459093521 USD 985.6 985.6 BB+ 2009 
Lloyds Bank GB 11.04 19/03/2020 2009-12-01 XS0459088877 GBP 1223.7 2026.8 BB+ 2009 
Lloyds Bank GB 6.385 12/05/2020 2009-12-01 XS0459088794 EUR 999.1 1376.8 BBB- 2009 
Lloyds Bank GB 15 21/12/2019 2009-12-01 XS0459089412 EUR 734.3 1011.9 BBB- 2009 
Lloyds Bank GB 9.875 10/02/2023 2009-01-17 XS0459092127 GBP 95.4 158.0 BBB- 2009 
Lloyds Bank GB 7.588 12/05/2020 2009-01-12 XS0459086582 GBP 1217.2 2016.0 BB+ 2009 
Lloyds Bank GB 15 21/12/2019 2009-01-12 XS0459089255 GBP 1288.5 2134.0 BBB- 2009 
Lloyds Bank GB 6.439 23/05/2020 2009-01-12 XS0459088281 EUR 1072.4 1477.8 BB+ 2009 
Lloyds Bank GB 7.867 17/12/2019 2009-01-12 XS0459086749 GBP 550.3 911.4 BB+ 2009 
Lloyds Bank GB 8.875 07/02/2020 2009-01-12 XS0459087986 EUR 189.2 260.7 BBB- 2009 
Lloyds Bank GB 9.334 07/02/2020 2009-01-12 XS0459088109 GBP 345.0 571.4 BBB- 2009 
Lloyds Bank GB 7.869 25/08/2020 2009-01-12 XS0459093364 GBP 991.8 1642.6 BB+ 2009 
Lloyds Bank GB 7.875 01/11/2020 2009-01-12 XS0459093794 USD 985.6 985.6 BB+ 2009 
Lloyds Bank GB 7.375 12/03/2020 2009-01-12 XS0459090774 EUR 143.0 197.0 BB+ 2009 
Lloyds Bank GB 12.75 10/08/2020 2009-01-12 XS0459091079 GBP 95.1 157.6 BBB- 2009 
Lloyds Bank GB 7.625 14/10/2020 2009-01-12 XS0459091236 EUR 341.4 470.4 BB+ 2009 
Lloyds Bank GB 10.5 29/09/2023 2009-01-12 XS0459092473 GBP 114.3 189.2 BBB- 2009 
Lloyds Bank GB 9.125 15/07/2020 2009-01-12 XS0459090188 GBP 245.3 406.3 BBB- 2009 
Lloyds Bank GB 11.875 01/09/2024 2009-01-12 XS0459092556 GBP 58.6 97.1 BBB- 2009 
Lloyds Bank GB 15 22/01/2029 2009-01-12 XS0459089685 GBP 112.8 186.8 BBB- 2009 
Lloyds Bank GB 8.5 07/06/2032 2009-01-12 XS0459092986 GBP 173.4 287.2 BBB- 2009 
Lloyds Bank GB 14.5 30/01/2022 2009-01-12 XS0459091822 GBP 132.1 218.7 BBB- 2009 
Lloyds Bank GB 7.625 09/12/2019 2009-01-12 XS0459091582 GBP 251.7 416.9 BBB- 2009 
Lloyds Bank GB 7.975 15/09/2024 2009-01-12 XS0459086822 GBP 169.6 280.9 BB+ 2009 
Lloyds Bank GB 16.125 10/12/2024 2009-01-12 XS0459093281 GBP 102.0 168.9 BBB- 2009 
Lloyds Bank GB 9 15/07/2029 2009-01-12 XS0459092804 GBP 178.6 295.8 BBB- 2009 
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Lloyds Bank GB 11.25 14/09/2023 2009-01-12 XS0459092390 GBP 158.1 261.8 BBB- 2009 
Lloyds Bank GB 9 15/12/2019 2009-01-12 XS0459091665 GBP 160.8 266.3 BBB- 2009 
Lloyds Bank GB 11.125 04/11/2020 2009-01-12 XS0459090691 GBP 64.1 106.2 BBB- 2009 
Lloyds Bank GB 3.36 12/03/2020 2009-01-12 XS0459090931 EUR 80.1 110.3 BB+ 2009 
Lloyds Bank GB 8.125 15/12/2019 2009-01-12 XS0459091749 GBP 6.7 11.2 BB+ 2009 
 
Appendix 2 - Issue features all issues 
*Perpetual (Yes=1, NO=0), Regulatory (1, 2) (Tier1=1, Tier2=0), Loss absorption (Equity=1, write-down=0), Callable (Yes=1, NO=0), Trigger (lower or 
standard 5,125=1, higher than 5,125=0), Coupon Type (fixed=1, Floating=0), Coupon Frequency (Annual=1, quarterly, semiannually=0) 
Issuer  ISIN Perpetual Regulatory Loss absorbtion Callable Trigger Coupon Type Coupon Frequency 
Bendigo and Adelaide Bank AU3FN0021952 0 N/A N/A 1 N/A 0 0 
Credit Agricole USF22797RT78 1 1 0 1 1 1 0 
Credit Agricole US225313AD75 1 1 0 1 1 0 0 
Ostjydsk Bank (EXCLUDED) DK0030323456 0 N/A N/A 0 N/A N/A N/A 
Den Jyske Sparekasse (EXCLUDED) DK0030298088 0 N/A N/A 0 N/A N/A N/A 
Spar Nord Bank (EXCLUDED) DK0030178421 0 N/A N/A 0 N/A N/A N/A 
Press Kogyo  (EXCLUDED) XS0976017474 0 N/A N/A 0 N/A N/A N/A 
Banco Santander US05969BAB99 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 
Banco Santander USP1507SAD91 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 
Societe Generale US83367TBF57 1 1 0 1 1 0 0 
Societe Generale USF8586CRW49 1 1 0 1 1 0 0 
Credit Suisse US22546DAB29 1 1 0 1 1 0 0 
Barclays  XS1002801758 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 
Danske Bank XS0999631665 0 0 N/A 1 N/A 1 1 
Barclays  US06738EAA38 1 N/A N/A 1 N/A 1 0 
Credit Suisse XS0989394589 1 1 0 1 1 0 0 
United Overseas Bank SG58I7998534 1 1 0 1 N/A 1 0 
DBS Group SG59H0999851 1 1 0 1 N/A 0 0 
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China CITIC Bank XS0985263150 0 0 0 1 N/A 0 0 
Home Credit & Finance Bank US29843LAC72 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 
Russian Agricultural Bank XS0979891925 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 
Home Credit & Finance Bank XS0981028177 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 
Banco Popular Espanol XS0979444402 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 
Bank of India INE084A08045 0 0 0 0 N/A 1 1 
Gazprombank XS0975320879 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 
Credit Agricole USF22797QT87 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 
Credit Agricole US225313AC92 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 
Credit Suisse XS0972523947 0 0 0 1 1 0 1 
Hellenic Bank CY0144170111 0 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
Hellenic Bank CY0144180110 0 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
Banco Bilbao Vizcaya Argentaria XS0926832907 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 
Credit Suisse CH0221803791 1 1 0 1 1 0 1 
Credit Suisse XS0957135212 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 
Credit Suisse US22546DAA46 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 
United Overseas Bank SG57A1994579 1 1 0 1 N/A 1 0 
Russian Agricultural Bank US74973DAJ81 0 0 0 0 N/A 1 0 
Societe Generale XS0867614595 1 1 0 1 1 0 0 
UBS  CH0214139930 0 0 0 1 N/A 0 1 
Sberbank  XS0935311240 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 
Suncorp  AU0000SUNPD6 0 N/A N/A 1 N/A 0 0 
Barclays  US06739FHK03 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 
Swiss Re (EXCLUDED)  XS0901578681 0 0 0 1 N/A 0 1 
Industrial & Commercial Bank of China Asia XS0976879279 0 0 0 1 N/A 0 0 
Banco do Brasil US05958AAK43 1 N/A 0 1 0 0 0 
KBC  BE6248510610 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 
Banco do Brasil USG07402DP58 1 N/A 0 1 0 0 0 
Hoist Kredit SE0005280591 0 0 0 1 N/A 1 0 
Glarner Kantonalbank CH0201215511 1 N/A N/A 1 N/A 0 1 
Barclays  US06740L8C27 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 
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Julius Baer CH0194437668 1 1 0 1 1 0 1 
UBS  US90261AAB89 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 
VTB Bank  US91834KAA43 1 1 0 1 N/A 0 0 
Credit Suisse XS0810846617 1 1 0 1 0 1 1 
Banco Popular Espanol XS0799651038 0 N/A 1 1 1 1 0 
Banco BPI PTBBRCOM0037 0 1 N/A 0 1 0 0 
VTB Bank  XS0810596832 1 1 0 1 N/A 0 0 
Swiss Re (EXCLUDED)  XS0765564827 1 N/A N/A 1 N/A 1 1 
Macquarie XS0763122909 0 0 1 1 1 1 0 
Credit Suisse CH0181115681 0 0 1 1 1 0 1 
Banco Popular Espanol ES0213790035 0 N/A N/A 0 N/A N/A N/A 
Credit Europe Bank XS0764697842 0 N/A N/A 0 N/A 1 0 
Banco do Brasil US05958AAG31 1 N/A 0 1 0 1 0 
UBS  XS0747231362 0 0 0 1 N/A 0 1 
Swiss Re (EXCLUDED)  CH0142132049 1 1 1 1 N/A 1 1 
Zuercher  CH0143808332 N/A 1 N/A 1 0 1 1 
Banco do Brasil USP3772WAC66 1 1 0 1 0 1 0 
Nomura  JP376260ABC4 0 N/A N/A 1 N/A 1 0 
Nomura Holdings JP376260BBC2 0 N/A N/A 1 N/A 1 0 
Rabobank  XS0703303262 1 1 0 1 0 1 0 
Industrial & Commercial Bank of China Asia HK0000091832 0 N/A N/A 0 N/A 1 0 
BankNordik DK0030278643 0 N/A N/A 0 N/A N/A N/A 
Permanent TSB IE00B712BB11 0 N/A N/A 0 N/A N/A N/A 
Bank of Cyprus CY0141900114 1 1 1 N/A N/A 1 0 
Bank of Ireland XS0862044798 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 
Allied Irish Banks IE00B51GP956 0 0 1 0 N/A 1 1 
Credit Suisse XS0595225318 0 0 1 1 0 1 0 
Rabobank  XS0583302996 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
Intesa  XS0545782020 1 0 0 1 0 1 1 
UniCredit  XS0527624059 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 
Lloyds Bank XS0496068429 0 1 1 0 N/A 1 0 
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Rabobank  XS0496281618 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 
Sparekassen Sjaelland (EXCLUDED) DK0030265905 0 N/A N/A 0 N/A N/A N/A 
Yorkshire Building Society (EXCLUDED) XS0498549194 0 0 1 N/A 1 N/A N/A 
Lloyds Bank XS0471770817 1 N/A N/A 1 N/A 1 0 
Lloyds Bank XS0473103348 1 N/A N/A 1 N/A 1 0 
Lloyds Bank XS0471767276 1 N/A N/A 1 N/A 1 0 
Lloyds Bank XS0473106283 1 N/A N/A 1 N/A 1 0 
Lloyds Bank XS0459093521 0 0 1 0 1 1 0 
Lloyds Bank XS0459088877 0 0 1 0 1 1 0 
Lloyds Bank XS0459088794 0 0 1 0 1 1 1 
Lloyds Bank XS0459089412 0 0 1 0 1 1 0 
Lloyds Bank XS0459092127 0 0 1 0 1 1 1 
Lloyds Bank XS0459086582 0 0 1 0 1 1 0 
Lloyds Bank XS0459089255 0 0 1 0 1 1 0 
Lloyds Bank XS0459088281 0 0 1 0 1 1 1 
Lloyds Bank XS0459086749 0 0 1 0 1 1 1 
Lloyds Bank XS0459087986 0 0 1 0 1 1 1 
Lloyds Bank XS0459088109 0 0 1 0 1 1 1 
Lloyds Bank XS0459093364 0 0 1 0 1 1 0 
Lloyds Bank XS0459093794 0 0 1 0 1 1 0 
Lloyds Bank XS0459090774 0 0 1 0 1 1 1 
Lloyds Bank XS0459091079 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 
Lloyds Bank XS0459091236 0 0 1 0 1 1 1 
Lloyds Bank XS0459092473 0 0 1 0 1 1 1 
Lloyds Bank XS0459090188 0 0 1 0 1 1 1 
Lloyds Bank XS0459092556 0 0 1 0 1 1 0 
Lloyds Bank XS0459089685 0 0 1 0 1 1 0 
Lloyds Bank XS0459092986 0 0 1 0 1 1 1 
Lloyds Bank XS0459091822 0 0 1 0 1 1 0 
Lloyds Bank XS0459091582 0 0 1 0 1 1 1 
Lloyds Bank XS0459086822 0 0 1 0 1 1 0 
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Lloyds Bank XS0459093281 0 0 1 0 1 1 0 
Lloyds Bank XS0459092804 0 0 1 0 1 1 1 
Lloyds Bank XS0459092390 0 0 1 0 1 1 0 
Lloyds Bank XS0459091665 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 
Lloyds Bank XS0459090691 0 0 1 0 1 1 1 
Lloyds Bank XS0459090931 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 
Lloyds Bank XS0459091749 0 0 1 0 1 1 1 
 
Appendix 3 - Descriptive statistics on all variables 
 Mean Median Maximum Minimum Std. Dev. Skewness Kurtosis  Jarque-Bera Probability Sum Sum Sq. Dev. Observations 
CALLABLE Y/N 
0.55 1.00 1.00 0.00 0.50 -0.21 1.04  374.67 0.00  1239.00 555.81  2247 
COCO SPREAD 
5.40 5.12 17.34 -0.29 2.53 0.53 3.37  44.74 0.00  4614.10 5464.97  854 
COUPON FREQ 
0.32 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.47 0.79 1.62  398.56 0.00  693.00 473.11  2184 
COUPON TYPE 
0.68 1.00 1.00 0.00 0.47 -0.78 1.61  409.66 0.00  1533.00 487.12  2247 
CTIER1 
11.10 10.80 29.30 -1.90 2.55 0.77 6.79  847.40 0.00  13486.76 7877.17  1215 
LEV 
18.75 19.64 45.88 1.94 6.55 0.12 3.77  52.32 0.00  35657.61 81658.04  1902 
LN ISSUE SIZE 
6.25 6.52 8.01 1.91 1.23 -0.73 3.03  205.65 0.00  14317.21 3472.23  2289 
LN RETURN 
0.03 0.02 2.57 -2.71 0.29 -0.38 24.59  37066.65 0.00  53.11 158.97  1906 
LN TA 
13.10 13.83 14.52 7.16 1.46 -1.92 6.45  2110.38 0.00  24844.85 4022.89  1897 
LOSS ABSORPTION 
0.47 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.50 0.11 1.01  311.51 0.00  882.00 465.78  1869 
NON PERF LOANS 
3.42 2.31 46.28 0.04 3.52 3.12 24.60  33095.88 0.00  5370.34 19413.88  1571 
PERPETUAL Y/N 
0.29 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.46 0.91 1.82  445.92 0.00  672.00 474.72  2289 
PUBLIC OR PRIVATE Y/N 
0.83 1.00 1.00 0.00 0.37 -1.80 4.25  1390.98 0.00  1911.00 315.58  2289 
REGT AT1ORT2 
0.31 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.46 0.84 1.70  345.93 0.00  567.00 393.03  1848 
ROA 
0.25 0.22 13.90 -18.97 1.28 -3.43 61.46  263718.10 0.00  459.53 2975.14  1827 
TRIGGER LEVEL 
12.81 12.47 40.20 7.19 3.54 2.47 15.31  12983.68 0.00  22702.94 22254.31  1772 
TIER1 
0.75 1.00 1.00 0.00 0.43 -1.15 2.33  384.22 0.00  1197.00 299.25  1596 
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Appendix 4 - Correlation matrix on all variables 
 
 
CALLA
BLE Y/N 
COCO 
SPREA
D 
COUPO
N FREQ 
COUPO
N TYPE 
CTIE
R1 LEV 
LN 
ISS
UE 
SIZ
E 
LN 
RETU
RN 
LN 
TA 
LOSS 
ABSORP
TION 
NON 
PERF 
LOANS 
PERPETU
AL Y/N 
PUBLIC OR 
PRIVATE 
Y/N 
REGT 
AT1O
RT2 ROA 
TRIGGE
R LEVEL 
TI
ER
1 
CALLABLE 
Y/N 1.00 
                COCO 
SPREAD -0.10 1.00 
               COUPON 
FREQ 0.06 0.11 1.00 
              COUPON 
TYPE -0.53 0.22 0.20 1.00 
             CTIER1 0.09 -0.34 -0.15 -0.18 1.00 
            LEV -0.28 -0.12 -0.21 -0.18 -0.13 1.00 
           LN ISSUE 
SIZE 0.09 -0.32 -0.31 -0.06 0.25 -0.06 1.00 
          LN RETURN -0.01 -0.45 -0.07 -0.09 0.39 0.09 0.05 1.00 
         
LN TA -0.27 0.20 -0.07 0.16 -0.36 0.57 
-
0.15 -0.05 1.00 
        LOSS 
ABSORPTION -0.55 0.25 0.05 0.36 -0.28 0.32 
-
0.40 -0.03 0.30 1.00 
       NON PERF 
LOANS -0.28 0.51 0.27 0.33 -0.59 -0.13 
-
0.33 -0.32 0.06 0.50 1.00 
      PERPETUAL 
Y/N 0.47 -0.02 0.08 -0.28 0.09 -0.44 0.19 -0.09 -0.32 -0.53 -0.10 1.00 
     PUBLIC OR 
PRIVATE Y/N NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA 
    REGT 
AT1ORT2 0.45 -0.07 0.07 -0.29 0.10 -0.32 0.14 0.01 -0.18 -0.51 -0.25 0.40 NA 1.00 
   ROA -0.03 0.14 -0.08 -0.06 0.18 -0.05 0.03 -0.08 -0.02 0.01 -0.08 -0.01 NA -0.13 1.00 
  TRIGGER 
LEVEL -0.59 0.07 -0.03 0.11 -0.01 0.31 
-
0.30 0.04 0.28 0.65 0.18 -0.39 NA -0.36 0.07 1.00 
 
TIER1 0.08 -0.17 -0.17 -0.19 0.90 -0.07 0.24 0.29 -0.24 -0.24 -0.49 0.09 NA 0.07 0.23 0.00 
1.0
0 
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Appendix 5 - Exchange rates and datastream codes (2014-01-01) 
 
Currency Exchange rate DS codes -  Currency Exchange rate DS codes - 
USD/AUD 0.89465 S90215 AUSTDO$  AUD/EUR 1.54 Y05448 AUEURSP 
USD/CHF 1.1244 Y76698 USDOLSF  CHF/EUR 1.23 Y78376 SWEURSP 
USD/CNY 0.16518 S02448 CHINYUS  CNY/EUR 8.34 Y05459 CHEURSP  
USD/DKK 0.1845 S02450 DANKRUS  DKK/EUR 7.46 Y05465 DKEURSP 
USD/EUR 1.37795 S98991 USEURSP  EUR/EUR 1.00   
USD/GBP 1.65625 S19571 USDOLLR  GBP/EUR 0.83 S242W3 TEGBPSP 
USD/INR 0.0161525 S02460 INDRUP$  INR/EUR 85.23 Y05474 INEURSP 
USD/JPY 0.0161525 S02465 JAPYNUS  JPY/EUR 144.83 S98992 JPEURSP 
USD/SEK 0.15525 S02488 SWEDKUS  SEK/EUR 8.85 Y05508 SDEURSP 
USD/SGD 0.7917 S02483 SINGDUS  SGD/EUR 1.74 Y05502 SGEURSP  
USD/USD 1    USD/EUR 1.38 S98991 USEURSP 
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Appendix 6 - Definitions of variables in S&P Capital IQ 
 
  
  
Tier 1  
 Tier 1 Capital Ratio % represents Tier 1 Capital as a percentage of Total Risk-Weighted Assets of the Bank. 
Core Tier 1 
 Core Tier 1 Capital Ratio represents core tier 1 capital ratio which is expressed as a percentage of core tier 1 capital to 
that of risk-weighted assets. 
ROA  
 (EBIT [+] * 0.625) / ((Total Assets [+](t) + Total Assets [+](t-1)) / 2) 
 Notes: 
 (1) If both periods of data (t and t-1) are not available then the ratio will be shown as NM 
 (2) If the denominator is less than or equal to zero then the ratio will be shown as NM 
Non 
performing 
 
 Non Performing Loans [+] / Total Assets [+] 
 Notes: 
 (1) If the denominator is less than or equal to zero then the ratio will be shown as NM 
 (2) If the margin value is less than (300%) then the value will be shown as NM 
Total assets 
 Total Assets is subtotal line item across all templates with the following components: 
  
 Banks template: 
 Cash And Equivalents [+]  
 Total investments [+]  
 Net Loans [+] 
 Net Property, Plant & Equipment [+]  
 Goodwill [+]  
 Other Intangibles, Total - (Template Specific) [+]  
 Investment in FHLB [+]  
 Other Assets, Total - (Template Specific) [+]  
 Total Current Assets [+]  
 Net Property, Plant & Equipment [+]  
 Long-term Investments [+]  
 Goodwill [+]  
 Other Intangibles, Total [+]  
 Finance Div. Loans and Leases, LT [+]  
 Finance Division Other Long-Term Assets, Total [+]  
 Other Assets, Total [+]  
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Appendix 7 - Government bond yields used to calculate spreads 
 
 Country Denmark EURO AREA JAPAN SWITZERLAND UK US 
 Maturity 10y 10y 10y 10y 10y 10y 
 Issue currency 
linked 
DKK EUR JPY CHF GBP USD, plus other 
 Datastream 
code 
DKBRYLD. EMBRYLD. JPBRYLD. SWBRYLD. UKBRYLD. USBRYLD. 
2009-03-31  3.79 3.69 1.34 1.92 3.89 3.57 
2009-06-30  3.79 3.99 1.36 2.31 4.20 4.31 
2009-09-30  3.64 3.64 1.29 1.98 3.95 4.05 
2009-12-30  3.37 3.53 1.28 1.93 4.44 4.63 
2010-03-31  2.68 3.49 1.39 1.81 4.39 4.71 
2010-06-30  2.38 3.34 1.09 1.50 3.90 3.89 
2010-09-30  3.02 3.03 0.93 1.35 3.46 3.68 
2010-12-31  3.57 3.73 1.12 1.59 3.87 4.33 
2011-03-30  3.24 4.02 1.26 1.88 4.07 4.51 
2011-06-30  2.10 3.91 1.14 1.65 4.10 4.38 
2011-09-30  1.68 3.42 1.03 0.94 3.06 2.92 
2011-12-30  1.84 3.86 0.99 0.67 2.55 2.89 
2012-03-30  1.48 3.33 0.99 0.81 2.84 3.35 
2012-06-29  1.26 3.35 0.84 0.58 2.36 2.77 
2012-09-28  1.03 3.03 0.78 0.53 2.22 2.83 
2012-12-31  1.47 2.67 0.79 0.46 2.34 2.94 
2013-03-29  1.88 2.68 0.56 0.63 2.39 3.11 
2013-06-28  1.97 2.75 0.84 0.99 2.97 3.50 
2013-09-30  1.99 2.94 0.69 1.04 3.07 3.69 
2013-12-31  1.99 2.78 0.74 1.09 3.38 3.94 
2014-03-31  1.62 2.34 0.63 0.96 3.24 3.56 
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Appendix 8 – Non-linearity test with squared variables. (Eviews output) 
 
Dependent Variable: COCO_SPREAD  
Method: Panel Least Squares   
Date: 05/20/14   Time: 14:58   
Sample (adjusted): 12/01/2010 12/01/2013  
Periods included: 13   
Cross-sections included: 55   
Total panel (unbalanced) observations: 351  
White cross-section standard errors & covariance (d.f. corrected) 
WARNING: estimated coefficient covariance matrix is of reduced rank 
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     ROA -0.532219 0.203558 -2.614581 0.0094 
TIER1 -0.204900 0.261851 -0.782509 0.4345 
NON_PERF_LOANS 0.223761 0.145890 1.533759 0.1261 
LEV -0.019502 0.131404 -0.148409 0.8821 
CALLABLE__Y_N_ 0.185036 0.192527 0.961093 0.3372 
COUPON_FREQ -0.593909 0.083774 -7.089445 0.0000 
COUPON_TYPE 1.267000 0.407329 3.110507 0.0020 
LOSS_ABSORPTION -0.084226 0.223744 -0.376440 0.7068 
PERPETUAL__Y_N_ 1.219786 0.291536 4.184005 0.0000 
REGT__AT1ORT2_ 0.873334 0.204454 4.271534 0.0000 
TRIGGER_LEVEL -0.798457 0.202166 -3.949505 0.0001 
LN_ISSUE_SIZE_ -0.465139 0.061899 -7.514482 0.0000 
LN_RETURN_ 0.391943 0.200851 1.951407 0.0519 
LN_TA_ -0.283768 0.277740 -1.021703 0.3077 
ROA2 -0.087857 0.027784 -3.162102 0.0017 
TIER12 0.004976 0.008818 0.564299 0.5729 
LEV2 0.000946 0.002313 0.408984 0.6828 
NON_PERF_LOANS2 -0.008561 0.009974 -0.858260 0.3914 
C 13.69150 1.852432 7.391096 0.0000 
     
      Effects Specification   
     
     Period fixed (dummy variables)  
     
     R-squared 0.931164    Mean dependent var 6.425861 
Adjusted R-squared 0.924711    S.D. dependent var 2.672636 
S.E. of regression 0.733341    Akaike info criterion 2.301762 
Sum squared resid 172.0927    Schwarz criterion 2.642743 
Log likelihood -372.9593    Hannan-Quinn criter. 2.437471 
F-statistic 144.2913    Durbin-Watson stat 1.034750 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000    
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Appendix 9 - Non-linearity test with all variables as a product of leverage. (Eviews output) 
 
 
Dependent Variable: COCO_SPREAD  
Method: Panel Least Squares   
Date: 05/20/14   Time: 15:00   
Sample (adjusted): 12/01/2010 12/01/2013  
Periods included: 13   
Cross-sections included: 55   
Total panel (unbalanced) observations: 351  
White cross-section standard errors & covariance (d.f. corrected) 
WARNING: estimated coefficient covariance matrix is of reduced rank 
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     ROA 0.072520 0.599974 0.120872 0.9039 
TIER1 0.380568 0.176696 2.153808 0.0320 
NON_PERF_LOANS 0.107730 0.224899 0.479016 0.6323 
LEV 0.295859 0.117765 2.512281 0.0125 
CALLABLE__Y_N_ 0.199125 0.194497 1.023796 0.3067 
COUPON_FREQ -0.579814 0.088656 -6.540033 0.0000 
COUPON_TYPE 1.371738 0.369623 3.711186 0.0002 
LOSS_ABSORPTION 0.020227 0.345271 0.058582 0.9533 
PERPETUAL__Y_N_ 1.341338 0.314389 4.266495 0.0000 
REGT__AT1ORT2_ 0.866310 0.208594 4.153089 0.0000 
TRIGGER_LEVEL -0.797627 0.246934 -3.230127 0.0014 
LN_ISSUE_SIZE_ -0.467740 0.060567 -7.722681 0.0000 
LN_RETURN_ 0.342347 0.298248 1.147861 0.2519 
LN_TA_ 0.045802 0.116332 0.393721 0.6940 
ROALEV -0.013212 0.043498 -0.303734 0.7615 
TIER1LEV -0.023670 0.008665 -2.731738 0.0066 
NON_PERF_LOANSLEV 0.002103 0.015323 0.137277 0.8909 
C 2.506491 3.672898 0.682429 0.4955 
     
      Effects Specification   
     
     Period fixed (dummy variables)  
     
     R-squared 0.930164    Mean dependent var 6.425861 
Adjusted R-squared 0.923855    S.D. dependent var 2.672636 
S.E. of regression 0.737497    Akaike info criterion 2.310487 
Sum squared resid 174.5927    Schwarz criterion 2.640468 
Log likelihood -375.4904    Hannan-Quinn criter. 2.441817 
F-statistic 147.4309    Durbin-Watson stat 1.052664 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000    
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Appendix 10 - Jarque Bera normality test. (Eviews output) 
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Series: Standardized Residuals
Sample 12/01/2010 12/01/2013
Observations 351
Mean      -3.67e-17
Median  -0.008797
Maximum  2.873361
Minimum -1.722053
Std. Dev.   0.712322
Skewness   0.346584
Kurtosis   3.673873
Jarque-Bera  13.66835
Probability  0.001076
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Appendix 11 - Redundant fixed effect test (Eviews output) 
 
 
Redundant Fixed Effects Tests   
Equation: Untitled   
Test period fixed effects   
     
     Effects Test Statistic   d.f.  Prob.  
     
     Period F 168.225000 (12,324) 0.0000 
Period Chi-square 694.388872 12 0.0000 
     
          
Period fixed effects test equation:  
Dependent Variable: COCO_SPREAD  
Method: Panel Least Squares   
Date: 05/20/14   Time: 15:05   
Sample (adjusted): 12/01/2010 12/01/2013  
Periods included: 13   
Cross-sections included: 55   
Total panel (unbalanced) observations: 351  
White cross-section standard errors & covariance (d.f. corrected) 
WARNING: estimated coefficient covariance matrix is of reduced rank 
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     ROA 0.425286 0.358600 1.185961 0.2365 
TIER1 0.308352 0.093708 3.290576 0.0011 
NON_PERF_LOANS 0.531534 0.140978 3.770340 0.0002 
LEV -0.105772 0.110376 -0.958289 0.3386 
CALLABLE__Y_N_ 0.430434 0.231860 1.856436 0.0643 
COUPON_FREQ -0.545668 0.128800 -4.236556 0.0000 
COUPON_TYPE 1.042815 0.362955 2.873129 0.0043 
LOSS_ABSORPTION 0.678201 0.446198 1.519952 0.1295 
PERPETUAL__Y_N_ 0.456961 0.505900 0.903263 0.3670 
REGT__AT1ORT2_ 1.046907 0.416512 2.513511 0.0124 
TRIGGER_LEVEL -0.557009 0.458470 -1.214930 0.2252 
LN_ISSUE_SIZE_ -0.540849 0.073101 -7.398690 0.0000 
LN_RETURN_ -3.563599 2.387929 -1.492339 0.1365 
LN_TA_ 1.658557 0.667163 2.485985 0.0134 
C -18.86347 8.243380 -2.288318 0.0227 
     
     R-squared 0.486377    Mean dependent var 6.425861 
Adjusted R-squared 0.464976    S.D. dependent var 2.672636 
S.E. of regression 1.954909    Akaike info criterion 4.220360 
Sum squared resid 1284.081    Schwarz criterion 4.385351 
Log likelihood -725.6732    Hannan-Quinn criter. 4.286025 
F-statistic 22.72684    Durbin-Watson stat 1.643732 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000    
     
     
 
 
 
 
